Ross Douthat had a column yesterday about why the parties are moving apart on immigration. The key passage: "the cycle started with a gap between the elite consensus on immigration —
unabashedly in favor — and the public’s more conflicted attitudes, which
differ depending on the day’s headlines and the wording of the polling
questions. Across the first 15 years of the 21st century, too many
Beltway attempts to simply impose the elite consensus set the stage for
backlash, populism, Trump." Then Trump implemented cruel and ineffective policies, and Democrats reacted against them. The later part seems right--the Democratic presidential candidates are competing to show how strongly they oppose Trump. But the part I quoted seems wrong in two ways.
First, although the public's attitudes are "conflicted" in the sense that they are not straightforwardly pro-immigration or anti-immigration, they are pretty stable. For example, here is a question from 2011: "Which comes closest to your view about illegal immigrants who
are currently working in the US (United States)?...They should be
allowed to stay in their jobs and to eventually apply for US
citizenship. They should be allowed to stay in their jobs only as
temporary guest workers but not to apply for US citizenship. They
should be required to leave their jobs and leave the US." 44% chose the first option, 26% the second, and 26% the third. One from December 2014: "Which of the following comes closest to your view about what
government policy should be toward illegal immigrants currently in the
United States? Should the government...send all illegal immigrants back
to their home country, have a guest worker program that allows
immigrants to remain in the United States to work, but only for a
limited amount of time, or allow illegal immigrants to remain in the
country and eventually qualify for US citizenship, but only if they meet
certain requirements like paying back taxes, learning English, and
passing a background check?" 17% chose the first, 16% the second, and 63% the third. Here's one from September 2018 "Which statement comes closest to your view about how the
immigration system should deal with immigrants who are currently living
in the US illegally? The immigration system should allow them a way to
become citizens provided they meet certain requirements, allow them to
become permanent legal residents, but not citizens, or identify and
deport them?" On this, it was 62%, 16%, and 21%. That is, about 20 % favor a hard-line policy, maybe a quarter favor letting them stay but not become citizens, and most favor a "path to citizenship." I think most of the difference between the first question and the other two is that the first one just talks about having jobs, while the others mention other requirements. That is, there is strong support for citizenship for "worthy" illegal immigrants, and the more "worthy" qualities you specify, the stronger it gets (as much as 89% for "for illegal immigrants who were brought to the US as children if
they meet certain requirements such as going to college or joining the
military, and not having a criminal record?")
Second, on the "elite consensus": there was a bill in 2013 that provided a path to citizenship, which passed the Senate with a bipartisan majority of 68-32. But it was never voted on in the House, because the Republican majority objected to it. That's not because the bill was unpopular with the public--several surveys showed a majority in favor, or in favor if they added "tougher provisions for border security." I haven't found any that showed a majority, or anything close to a majority, in favor of just rejecting it.
There may be a pro-immigration consensus among academic elites, or journalistic elites, but they don't make the laws. There was not, and is not, anything resembling a consensus among political elites: most Republican elites have taken a position well to the right of the public. The "populist" revolt was not a response to efforts to impose an elite consensus, but to the division among political elites: it seemed like there was an agreement, and then it fell apart, so people turned to someone who said that he could cut through the gridlock and make "deals." Oddly, Douthat got the situation pretty much right in 2010 when, comparing the United States and Europe on climate change, he said "America’s major political parties generally tend to be more responsive
to public opinion, and less constrained by elite sentiment, than their
counterparts in Europe." Although with the benefit of hindsight, I would say it's not just that America's major political parties are more responsive to public opinion, but that they are inclined to accentuate any potential division in public opinion.
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
Monday, July 8, 2019
Monday, July 1, 2019
More on busing
In March, I had a post on public opinion concerning busing in the 1970s. I didn't expect that to become an issue in the presidential campaign, but in the wake of the exchange between Kamala Harris and Joe Biden in last week's debate people are talking about busing again (although I don't think anyone's proposed bringing it back). At first, the general view among people who commented on the exchange seemed to be that Biden had something to apologize for, but now some are making the point I made: that busing was unpopular with the public. A New York Times story refers to a 1973 Gallup Poll that found only 9% of blacks and 5% of whites thought busing was the best way to integrate the schools. But that's not a very good measure of support for busing--for example, someone could have thought the integration of housing was the best way to integrate schools in the long run, but also favored busing as something that could be done immediately. The question asked about "integration in terms of different economic and racial groups": 27% chose "change school boundaries," 22% chose "create more housing for low-income people in middle-income neighborhoods," 5% busing, 22% "do something other than the above," and 18 percent "I oppose the integration of schools", while 17% had no opinion (those add to over 100%, so the question must have allowed multiple answers).
The Gallup Poll also had a question that started in 1970 and was later picked up by the General Social Survey: "In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of negro [later black or African-American] and white school children from one school district to another?" The percent who said they favored it is shown in the figure:
An upward trend, but support was under 20% during the 1970s. However, the question just asked about "busing"--integration was implied, but not explicitly mentioned. Maybe mentioning a goal that most people supported made a difference? In 1975, Roper asked "are you in favor of or opposed to school busing to achieve racial integration in the public schools?" 12% said they were in favor, 74% opposed, and 10% volunteered that they had mixed feelings. That's not much different from the 17% support in the Gallup/GSS question that year. A couple of polls taken for Richard Nixon in 1971 and 1972 asked about "busing of students on a compulsory basis to achieve racial integration" and found 17% in favor. In 1976-8, some surveys asked whether "Racial integration of the schools should be achieved even it requires busing": 20-25% said yes, which was a little higher than support in the Gallup/GSS question. So mentioning integration seems to have made only a little difference.
Finally, in 1976 there was "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Sometimes busing may be necessary if it is the only way to integrate the schools.'" 40% agreed. That's considerably higher support. My guess is that some people regarded busing as justified in extreme cases, and that most of them would answer no to the "in general" question. I couldn't find any questions asking whether people thought busing was justified in particular cases (real or hypothetical).
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
The Gallup Poll also had a question that started in 1970 and was later picked up by the General Social Survey: "In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of negro [later black or African-American] and white school children from one school district to another?" The percent who said they favored it is shown in the figure:
An upward trend, but support was under 20% during the 1970s. However, the question just asked about "busing"--integration was implied, but not explicitly mentioned. Maybe mentioning a goal that most people supported made a difference? In 1975, Roper asked "are you in favor of or opposed to school busing to achieve racial integration in the public schools?" 12% said they were in favor, 74% opposed, and 10% volunteered that they had mixed feelings. That's not much different from the 17% support in the Gallup/GSS question that year. A couple of polls taken for Richard Nixon in 1971 and 1972 asked about "busing of students on a compulsory basis to achieve racial integration" and found 17% in favor. In 1976-8, some surveys asked whether "Racial integration of the schools should be achieved even it requires busing": 20-25% said yes, which was a little higher than support in the Gallup/GSS question. So mentioning integration seems to have made only a little difference.
Finally, in 1976 there was "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Sometimes busing may be necessary if it is the only way to integrate the schools.'" 40% agreed. That's considerably higher support. My guess is that some people regarded busing as justified in extreme cases, and that most of them would answer no to the "in general" question. I couldn't find any questions asking whether people thought busing was justified in particular cases (real or hypothetical).
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
Saturday, June 29, 2019
Maybe not so different
Paul Krugman recently had a column about the influence of rich people--"the 0.1 percent, or maybe the 0.01 percent"--on policy. Although I agree with his general point that they have too much influence, his primary example doesn't seem to support his case. The example is the concern with a "debt crisis" and preoccupation with cutting "entitlements" in 2010-11. He notes that Americans in general support more spending on Social Security, but says that "the rich, however, are different from you and me." There's not much information on the political opinions of the super-rich--even the survey he cites seems to cover something closer to the top 5% than the top 0.1%--but the General Social Survey lets us look at the general effects of income on opinions about spending on various programs including Social Security. I regressed opinions on whether we are spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on level of education (0=no high school diploma ... 4=grad degree) and real household income (in $100,000s). The results are summarized in this figure.
The "northeast" quadrant are things on which education and income are associated with support for more spending. They are: "highways and bridges" and "supporting scientific research." The southwest quadrant art things on which education and income are associated with support for less spending. They are social security and "assistance to the poor." The northwest quadrant are things for which more income is associated with support for less spending and more education with support for more. That is, for most people (well-off and well educated, or low income and low education) education and income are working in different directions. They are welfare, "improving the conditions of blacks," "improving and protecting the nation's health," "improving and protecting the environment," and "improving the nation's education system." There are no items in the southeast quadrant.
So the belief that we need to cut "entitlements" is not unique to the rich--it's also more common among well educated people. This probably explains why many journalists accepted it as common sense--it's not that they had "internalized the preferences of the extremely wealthy" (as Krugman says) but that they had similar preferences to start with. As far as why, I would guess that educated people are more aware of some relevant facts--a large part of the budget is devoted to Social Security (and Medicaid), and that part is almost certain to grow because of demographic changes, so if we don't contain spending there we'll have to cut other spending, raise taxes substantially, or eventually face a debt crisis. Since journalists tend to be more familiar with these issues, I expect they are more inclined to favor cuts than educated people generally.
Krugman would presumably answer that a these facts don't mean that we need to cut entitlements: if we want people to have a long and reasonably secure retirement, which most of us apparently do, we can and should raise taxes to pay for that. There are other economists who argue that we can't actually do that--the resulting taxes would reduce economic growth so much that we'd still have to cut other spending or face a debt crisis. There are also people who focus on politics rather than economics--in practice, it's hard to raise taxes, so regardless of what we could do in principle, if spending on social security continues to increase, it will mean spending cuts on other things. In any case, opinions on this topic are not just a reflection of self-interest.
Saturday, June 22, 2019
Postscript on elites and the public
In my last post, I noted that between 1998 and 2014 Democratic elites, Republican elites, and the public all became less likely to say that "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression," "strengthening
the United Nations," "helping to bring a democratic form of government
to other nations," and "combating world hunger," should be priorities, and that the move of Democratic elites was larger than that of the other groups. (I left out one that followed the same course--"promoting and defending human rights in other countries"). But I didn't mention the result: in 2014, the general public was more likely to say that all of those should be priorities than either Democratic or Republican elites.
Public D Elites R Elites
Protecting the weak 26% 20% 18%
UN 37% 27% 5%
Bring democracy 17% 12% 13%
World hunger 42% 40% 15%
Human rights 33% 32% 13%
All of these are goals that could be described as "humanitarian." I think this says something important about popular views of foreign policy. It's often suggested that the contrast is between an "nationalist" public and "internationalist" elites. There is something to that--the public is more likely to think we should focus on "problems here at home." But there is also a generous side to public opinion--if there are problems in a foreign country, people often feel that we should do something to help. So popular "nationalism" isn't equivalent to chauvinism or isolationism.
A couple of other postscripts:
1. In the column I mentioned in my last post, David Brooks said "a big part of the shift is caused by the fact that many Americans have lost faith in human nature and human possibility. . . . social trust has collapsed over the decades, especially among the young. Distrustful, alienated people don’t want to get involved in the strange, hostile, outside world." The survey he talks about includes a standard measure of trust also included in the General Social Survey. The GSS doesn't have many questions related to foreign policy issues, but there are a couple. One is whether the United States should take an active part in world affairs or stay out. Trust is strongly associated with opinions on this: 80% of people who say that most people can be trusted say yes, against 59% of those who say "you can't be too careful." Another is whether we are spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on foreign aid. Trust doesn't make any discernible difference on this question.
2. The 2014 survey asks about "limiting climate change" and "limiting global warming." These are the two issues on which there is the biggest gap between Democratic and Republican elites. 77% and 79% of Democratic elites say they should be very important goals--higher than any of the others, even preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. For Republican elites, it's 7% (lower than anything except strengthening the UN) and 15% (about the same as preventing world hunger and protecting human rights). The public was in the middle, with 40% and 45% saying they should be important goals. Oddly, many conservative elites seem to think that they are in tune with the public on this issue. I saw another in the New York Times the other day: Matthew Continetti wrote "behind the rise of outsider politicians such as Mr. Trump are the interrelated issues of unchecked immigration, terrorism and the imposition of carbon taxes and other measures to mitigate climate change. . . . efforts to fight climate change through regulation, international treaties and carbon pricing provoked a similar anti-elitist response." I think this is related to the assumption that "elites" are almost uniformly liberal that I mentioned a couple of posts ago.
Public D Elites R Elites
Protecting the weak 26% 20% 18%
UN 37% 27% 5%
Bring democracy 17% 12% 13%
World hunger 42% 40% 15%
Human rights 33% 32% 13%
All of these are goals that could be described as "humanitarian." I think this says something important about popular views of foreign policy. It's often suggested that the contrast is between an "nationalist" public and "internationalist" elites. There is something to that--the public is more likely to think we should focus on "problems here at home." But there is also a generous side to public opinion--if there are problems in a foreign country, people often feel that we should do something to help. So popular "nationalism" isn't equivalent to chauvinism or isolationism.
A couple of other postscripts:
1. In the column I mentioned in my last post, David Brooks said "a big part of the shift is caused by the fact that many Americans have lost faith in human nature and human possibility. . . . social trust has collapsed over the decades, especially among the young. Distrustful, alienated people don’t want to get involved in the strange, hostile, outside world." The survey he talks about includes a standard measure of trust also included in the General Social Survey. The GSS doesn't have many questions related to foreign policy issues, but there are a couple. One is whether the United States should take an active part in world affairs or stay out. Trust is strongly associated with opinions on this: 80% of people who say that most people can be trusted say yes, against 59% of those who say "you can't be too careful." Another is whether we are spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on foreign aid. Trust doesn't make any discernible difference on this question.
2. The 2014 survey asks about "limiting climate change" and "limiting global warming." These are the two issues on which there is the biggest gap between Democratic and Republican elites. 77% and 79% of Democratic elites say they should be very important goals--higher than any of the others, even preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. For Republican elites, it's 7% (lower than anything except strengthening the UN) and 15% (about the same as preventing world hunger and protecting human rights). The public was in the middle, with 40% and 45% saying they should be important goals. Oddly, many conservative elites seem to think that they are in tune with the public on this issue. I saw another in the New York Times the other day: Matthew Continetti wrote "behind the rise of outsider politicians such as Mr. Trump are the interrelated issues of unchecked immigration, terrorism and the imposition of carbon taxes and other measures to mitigate climate change. . . . efforts to fight climate change through regulation, international treaties and carbon pricing provoked a similar anti-elitist response." I think this is related to the assumption that "elites" are almost uniformly liberal that I mentioned a couple of posts ago.
Wednesday, June 19, 2019
Elites and the public, 1998-2014
Last week David Brooks had a column about public opinion on foreign policy, based on a survey by the Center for American Progress. In Brooks's summary "The top priorities . . . are all negative aspirations: preventing bad things from hostile outsiders. The lowest priorities were . . . the core activities of building a civilized global community." He suggested that this represented a change: "After Iraq and other debacles, many Americans are exhausted by the global leadership role. " However, to his credit, he didn't say that there was any survey evidence of a change.
I have been writing about a series of surveys that asked the public and elites about foreign policy priorities. So far, I have focused on the 1998 surveys, but now I'll look at changes between 1998 and 2014 among the public, elites who identify as Democrats, and elites who identify as Republicans. There were eleven issues which they asked about at both times. On one of them, "securing adequate supplies of energy," there was little change in any group. On four, "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression," "strengthening the United Nations," "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations," "combating world hunger," all groups moved in the same direction. In all of these, that direction was towards saying they should be a lower priority. This is in line with what Brooks suggested, although it's worth noting that the shifts were just as large among elites. More exactly, the were smaller among Republican elites, and larger among Democrats. As a result, there was a convergence of Democratic and Republican elites on these points. Basically, no one's idealistic now.
There were six on which the groups moved in different directions, or some moved and others didn't. Most of these involved divergence between Democratic and Republican elites. E, g., the percent of Republican elites who said that "maintaining superior military power worldwide" should be a top priority went from 77 to 85, while the percent of Democrats who said it should went from 44 to 37. Two of them deserve special note. On "controlling and reducing illegal immigration," the percent of the public who said it should be very important declined from 57 to 47; the percent of Democratic elites who said it should declined from 12 to 5, but the percent of Republican elites who said it should rose from 37 to 46. In 1998, the public was to the "right" of both elites; in 2014, the public was at essentially the same place as Republican elites. On "protecting the jobs of American workers," the public (81% in 1998, 77% in 2014) and Republican elites (41 and 40%) hardly changed, and Democrats rated it lower (40% in 1998, 30% in 2014).
Many accounts of Trump's success, like those by Peggy Noonan that I mentioned a couple of weeks ago, focus on immigration as the key. " immigration . . . is the issue of the moment, a real and concrete one but also a symbolic one: It stands for all the distance between governments and their citizens. It is of course the issue that made Donald Trump. . . If you are an unprotected American . . . you have absorbed some lessons from the past 20 years’ experience of illegal immigration. You know the Democrats won’t protect you and the Republicans won’t help you. Both parties refused to control the border. The Republicans were afraid of being called illiberal, racist, of losing a demographic for a generation." That would have been a reasonable thing to say in the 1990s, but by 2014, the public had moved left and the Republicans had moved right and lost whatever fears they might once have had about being called illiberal or racist.* In fact, in 2016 Donald Trump was pretty much in line with what had become the mainstream Republican view--the differences were that he gave more emphasis to it and talked about it more crudely.
"Protecting American jobs" is where there was a gap between the public and both parties; although Trump didn't offer clear plans, I think that people did sense that it was a priority for Trump and not for conventional Republicans or Democrats. It also occurs to me that this might have been a particular weakness for Hillary Clinton. Her stint as Secretary of State may have given people the sense that she was more concerned with foreign than domestic policy.
[data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
.
I have been writing about a series of surveys that asked the public and elites about foreign policy priorities. So far, I have focused on the 1998 surveys, but now I'll look at changes between 1998 and 2014 among the public, elites who identify as Democrats, and elites who identify as Republicans. There were eleven issues which they asked about at both times. On one of them, "securing adequate supplies of energy," there was little change in any group. On four, "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression," "strengthening the United Nations," "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations," "combating world hunger," all groups moved in the same direction. In all of these, that direction was towards saying they should be a lower priority. This is in line with what Brooks suggested, although it's worth noting that the shifts were just as large among elites. More exactly, the were smaller among Republican elites, and larger among Democrats. As a result, there was a convergence of Democratic and Republican elites on these points. Basically, no one's idealistic now.
There were six on which the groups moved in different directions, or some moved and others didn't. Most of these involved divergence between Democratic and Republican elites. E, g., the percent of Republican elites who said that "maintaining superior military power worldwide" should be a top priority went from 77 to 85, while the percent of Democrats who said it should went from 44 to 37. Two of them deserve special note. On "controlling and reducing illegal immigration," the percent of the public who said it should be very important declined from 57 to 47; the percent of Democratic elites who said it should declined from 12 to 5, but the percent of Republican elites who said it should rose from 37 to 46. In 1998, the public was to the "right" of both elites; in 2014, the public was at essentially the same place as Republican elites. On "protecting the jobs of American workers," the public (81% in 1998, 77% in 2014) and Republican elites (41 and 40%) hardly changed, and Democrats rated it lower (40% in 1998, 30% in 2014).
Many accounts of Trump's success, like those by Peggy Noonan that I mentioned a couple of weeks ago, focus on immigration as the key. " immigration . . . is the issue of the moment, a real and concrete one but also a symbolic one: It stands for all the distance between governments and their citizens. It is of course the issue that made Donald Trump. . . If you are an unprotected American . . . you have absorbed some lessons from the past 20 years’ experience of illegal immigration. You know the Democrats won’t protect you and the Republicans won’t help you. Both parties refused to control the border. The Republicans were afraid of being called illiberal, racist, of losing a demographic for a generation." That would have been a reasonable thing to say in the 1990s, but by 2014, the public had moved left and the Republicans had moved right and lost whatever fears they might once have had about being called illiberal or racist.* In fact, in 2016 Donald Trump was pretty much in line with what had become the mainstream Republican view--the differences were that he gave more emphasis to it and talked about it more crudely.
"Protecting American jobs" is where there was a gap between the public and both parties; although Trump didn't offer clear plans, I think that people did sense that it was a priority for Trump and not for conventional Republicans or Democrats. It also occurs to me that this might have been a particular weakness for Hillary Clinton. Her stint as Secretary of State may have given people the sense that she was more concerned with foreign than domestic policy.
[data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
.
Friday, June 14, 2019
Gaps between elite and public opinion
In a recent post, I mentioned a tendency (especially among conservatives) to assume that elites are to the left of the public. In the survey I discussed there, on foreign policy priorities, there was an elite-public gap on six of them. Those six, with the percent of each group saying that it should be a "very important" goal:
Public R Elite D Elite
Stopping drugs 83% 65% 45%
Illegal immigration 57% 37% 12%
Defending allies 45% 57% 59%
Protecting jobs 81% 41% 39%
Trade deficit 51% 32% 27%
Strengthening UN 44% 11% 39%
The first two can be seen in left-right terms (note the difference between Democratic and Republican elites), and elites of both parties are to the "left" of the public. The last one also can, but on that one elites of both parties are to the "right" of the public. That may seem surprising, since a lot of conservatives seem to think that denouncing the UN is a popular position. I think it says something interesting about popular views of international affairs, and I may write more about that later.
But then there are the middle three. These are not normally thought of as left-right issues, and there is little difference between Democratic and Republican elites and a substantial gap between elites and the public. On these, the differences may follow from greater sophistication (that is, knowing more and thinking more about the issues), or the influence of "experts." For example, people who think more about foreign relations are more likely to realize that we can't count on allies to help us when we need it unless we're ready to help them when they need it. The lower ratings of protecting jobs and the trade deficit follow from economic theory, which elites are more likely to be familiar with, at least at second hand. The ones on which there is a partisan difference but in which elites of both parties are on one side relative to the public may have similar explanations. For example, the lower priority for stopping drugs is probably not because elites don't care about drug use, but because they think of it as mostly a domestic problem rather than a foreign policy issue (no one would try to smuggle them in unless there was demand for them).
Of course, this doesn't mean that elite views are always right. My point is that the general "elites are out of touch" laments (and analyses of how that is supposed to have happened) are misleading.
These data are from 1998, and a lot has happened since then. There are comparable data from as late as 2014, which I'll look at in a later post.
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
Public R Elite D Elite
Stopping drugs 83% 65% 45%
Illegal immigration 57% 37% 12%
Defending allies 45% 57% 59%
Protecting jobs 81% 41% 39%
Trade deficit 51% 32% 27%
Strengthening UN 44% 11% 39%
The first two can be seen in left-right terms (note the difference between Democratic and Republican elites), and elites of both parties are to the "left" of the public. The last one also can, but on that one elites of both parties are to the "right" of the public. That may seem surprising, since a lot of conservatives seem to think that denouncing the UN is a popular position. I think it says something interesting about popular views of international affairs, and I may write more about that later.
But then there are the middle three. These are not normally thought of as left-right issues, and there is little difference between Democratic and Republican elites and a substantial gap between elites and the public. On these, the differences may follow from greater sophistication (that is, knowing more and thinking more about the issues), or the influence of "experts." For example, people who think more about foreign relations are more likely to realize that we can't count on allies to help us when we need it unless we're ready to help them when they need it. The lower ratings of protecting jobs and the trade deficit follow from economic theory, which elites are more likely to be familiar with, at least at second hand. The ones on which there is a partisan difference but in which elites of both parties are on one side relative to the public may have similar explanations. For example, the lower priority for stopping drugs is probably not because elites don't care about drug use, but because they think of it as mostly a domestic problem rather than a foreign policy issue (no one would try to smuggle them in unless there was demand for them).
Of course, this doesn't mean that elite views are always right. My point is that the general "elites are out of touch" laments (and analyses of how that is supposed to have happened) are misleading.
These data are from 1998, and a lot has happened since then. There are comparable data from as late as 2014, which I'll look at in a later post.
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
Saturday, June 8, 2019
We interrupt our regularly scheduled programming
I was going to write another post about the difference between the opinions of political elites and the general public, and I will in the not too distant future, but I saw a New York Times story about opinions on abortion. It pointed out that although the parties take clear positions in favor of legal abortion (Democrats) or against it (Republicans), a lot of people are somewhere in the middle: should be legal for this reason but not that, or generally available up to some point in the pregnancy and very limited after that.
The story allowed comments, and the most-liked comment (as I started this post) noted that they didn't show opinions of men and women separately. The author didn't explicitly say what she thought that would show, but the implication was pretty clear: "The effects of abortion laws cause women to lose their agency. subject women to invasive, degrading and unnecessary procedures and counseling, force women into economic hardship. If a set of laws are designed solely to denigrate the status of one segment of the population...." A couple of replies to the comment pointed out that there wasn't much difference between the opinions of men and women, but none of them got more than a handful of likes, so it seemed worthwhile to show the figures. These are from the General Social Survey, 2008-18. The general introduction is "please tell me whether you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if" and there are a number of questions giving different conditions. The percent of men and women who say abortion should be legal:
Men Women
The woman's health is seriously endangered 89% 88%
She became pregnant as a result of rape 80% 75%
There is a strong chance of a serious defect 76% 73%
She is married and does not want any more children 50% 44%
The family cannot afford any more children 47% 44%
The woman wants it for any reason 46% 44%
She is not married and does not want to marry the man 44% 41%
There is a small but definite tendency for men to give more support to legal abortion. Not all surveys find this--for example, this Pew survey finds women are slightly more in favor. "Little or no difference" would be a reasonable summary. It would be interesting to have information about whether people think there is a difference, but I don't know of any surveys that asked about that.
The story allowed comments, and the most-liked comment (as I started this post) noted that they didn't show opinions of men and women separately. The author didn't explicitly say what she thought that would show, but the implication was pretty clear: "The effects of abortion laws cause women to lose their agency. subject women to invasive, degrading and unnecessary procedures and counseling, force women into economic hardship. If a set of laws are designed solely to denigrate the status of one segment of the population...." A couple of replies to the comment pointed out that there wasn't much difference between the opinions of men and women, but none of them got more than a handful of likes, so it seemed worthwhile to show the figures. These are from the General Social Survey, 2008-18. The general introduction is "please tell me whether you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if" and there are a number of questions giving different conditions. The percent of men and women who say abortion should be legal:
Men Women
The woman's health is seriously endangered 89% 88%
She became pregnant as a result of rape 80% 75%
There is a strong chance of a serious defect 76% 73%
She is married and does not want any more children 50% 44%
The family cannot afford any more children 47% 44%
The woman wants it for any reason 46% 44%
She is not married and does not want to marry the man 44% 41%
There is a small but definite tendency for men to give more support to legal abortion. Not all surveys find this--for example, this Pew survey finds women are slightly more in favor. "Little or no difference" would be a reasonable summary. It would be interesting to have information about whether people think there is a difference, but I don't know of any surveys that asked about that.
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