Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Seen and not seen, part 1

This is the second part to appear, but it's what originally got me thinking about the possibility of differences in the reactions to income and wealth inequality, so I'm calling it part 1.  In recent years, popular evaluations of economic conditions have been very negative, even when the standard economic statistics are pretty good.  This seems to have started in the Biden administration, and it's continued in the second Trump administration.  Many people say this is because of inflation--people dislike price increases, and maybe even want prices to fall.  I don't find this convincing--if people were that averse to inflation, Nixon and Reagan would never have been re-elected.  And if the issue is changes in inflation, evaluations should have been getting more positive in the last few years.  So I started thinking about perceptions of changes in the distribution as an alternative--if people think that any gains are going to rich people, they will be discontented.  There aren't that many questions about perceived changes in inequality, but Pew has occasionally asked about expectations of the next few decades:  whether you think that the gap between rich and poor will become larger or smaller.   They also have a question about whether you expect the American economy to become stronger or weaker over the same time frame.  The figure shows summary measures (%larger-% smaller and %stronger-%weaker) for the questions:


In 2018 and 2023, people were more pessimistic about the gap between rich and poor and about the future of the economy than they had been in 1999 or 2010.  The future of the economy question was asked again in 2026 and people were more favorable then they had been in 2023, but less favorable than they'd been in the 1990s or even in 2010.  With only a few observations, you can't get strong statistical evidence for anything, but for what it's worth the correlation between expectations about the gap and the strength of the economy is -.79:  when people expected the gap to increase, they were more likely to think that the economy would become weaker.  That raises the question of why people became more likely to think that the gap between rich and poor would increase, which led to my previous post.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Seen and not seen

 The large increase in economic inequality since the 1970s hasn't provoked much reaction in the public--the strongest populist movements in the period have been the Ross Perot's campaign, the Tea Party and then Trumpism, none of which were about egalitarian redistribution.  But recently things seem to have been changing:  the left has been getting mileage out of targeting "billionaires" (and now at least one  trillionaire).  Although the California wealth tax proposition failed, the issue is now on the agenda, which wasn't the case a few years ago.  Why have things changed?  I think that part of the answer involves a distinction between different kinds of inequality.  This figure shows the top 1 percent's share of income (after taxes and transfers) over time:



It increased steadily from the late 1970s to early 2000s, but since then the rate of increase has slowed or maybe even stopped.  The next figure shows the share of wealth held by the top 0.1% from 1989 to 2023 (source).  That follows a different course, with a steady and rapid increase in the last 15 years:


My impression is that increases in top incomes were not very visible to the general public, since salaries and bonuses of CEOs and people in finance aren't regularly reported in the media.  That's partly because changes are usually incremental--getting an raise of 10% or 15% isn't newsworthy, but if a lot of people in top positions get annual increases of 10% or 15% it matters for overall inequality.   With wealth, however, there are newsworthy events--a company goes public or gets funding and suddenly some people have large fortunes.  For example, here's a headline that appeared in my news feed a few days ago:  "The World’s Youngest Self-Made Billionaires Just Doubled Their Fortunes." In many cases, like this one, the company isn't well known to the public--it's valuable because of what investors think it might do in the future, not because it has a substantial track record.  That is, people see other people getting rich without clearly having accomplishments that explain why.  




Friday, November 6, 2026

More on confidence in higher education

 As I observed in my last post, public confidence in higher education is fairly high compared to other institutions.  However, it's lower than it was a decade ago.  The figure shows the percent who say they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence.  There's a definite decline, and it's arguably the largest decline for any of the institutions in the Gallup data over the 2016-2026 period.  


Although the Gallup data on confidence in institutions goes back to the 1970s, they didn't start asking about higher education until 2016.  The General Social Survey also asks about confidence in institutions, but they don't include higher education.  But the Opinion Research Corporation asked about confidence in "colleges and universities" in 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983, so we can use that to get a sense of long-term change.

There are some differences in terminology--for example, Gallup asked about "the military" and the ORC asked about "the armed forces."  There's also a difference in the scale of the responses--Gallup gives the percent in the top two categories out of four, and the ORC gives low, medium, and high.*  So you might wonder if they can be treated as measuring the same thing.  The next figure compares Gallup and ORC measures of confidence for institutions that they both asked about in 1977.  The correlation is about 0.92, suggesting that they can.  


Now for the comparison of 1977 and 2026:


Colleges and universities ranked third out of twelve institutions in 1977, behind churches and banks.  They were also third in 2026, behind small business and the military. Small business and the military stand out for large relative increases.  For small business, some of that may be question wording--the ORC asked about "small companies," which I would interpret as including only businesses that have employees, not people who are working on their own or with family members.  But the Gallup question on small business shows a clear upward trend, although it wasn't asked regularly until the 21st century:


One final bit of information:  in 1994, Gallup asked about confidence in public colleges and universities and private colleges and universities.  49% said they had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in private colleges and universities, and 46 in public ones.  So that suggests that confidence increased between 1994 and 2016.   

The general point is that over the last 50 years, Americans haven't lost confidence in higher education specifically--the decline is typical of other institutions.  

*The original surveys used a seven point scale, but I am working from published reports that group them into three categories. 

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Friday, October 30, 2026

Unite the right?

 A few days ago, Michael Brendan Dougherty had an op-ed in the New York Times which said that the post-Trump GOP would include a wider range of views:  "What will unify this fractious coalition after Mr. Trump is a common enemy in the liberals of the credentialed class. That class staffs the very institutions — such as universities — that Americans have come to broadly distrust."  This seems like a poor choice of "common enemy":  about 40% of American adults have a bachelor's degree, and they vote at higher rates than people without a degree.  When you start by calling half of the voters the enemy, it's going to be hard to get a majority.  Moreover, even people who didn't attend college generally have friends or family members who did.  

Gallup regularly asks questions about how much confidence you have in various institutions:  a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little.  In June 2026, the responses for higher education were 18%, 20%, 37%, 24%, with 1% volunteering "no confidence."  Of the 17 institutions that Gallup asked about, higher education ranked fourth in combined great deal and quite a lot responses, in between the police (45%) and "the church or organized religion" (33%).  That provides a good standard for assessing Dougherty's vision for the Republicans:  a proposal that the Democrats could succeed by uniting against the police or organized religion as a "common enemy" would universally be regarded as foolish.  

OK, who should the Republicans unite against?  Traditionally the left has used rich people and big business as the enemy:  in the Gallup survey, only 17% say they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in big business.  In contrast, the right has generally maintained that everyone shares a common interest ("what's good for the country is good for General Motors and vice versa").  Rather than uniting against an enemy, they have focused on attaching themselves to widely popular things like the nation, the dominant religion, families, small business.  To the extent that there's an enemy, it's the misguided people who try to divide the country.  When the right has had an enemy defined by social position, it's been ethnic or religious minorities, and most of those cases are not ones that conservatives are proud of today.

Dougherty's dislike of the "credentialed class" is not unique to him--it seems to be widespread on the contemporary right.  It didn't come from Trump, who frequently mentions his graduation from an elite university as a point of pride and accuses his betes noires like Obama and Bill Maher of having been poor students.   The actions that the second Trump administration has taken against universities seem to have been driven by people who have attached themselves to Trump (e. g., Harmeet Dhillon, Chris Rufo, Linda McMahon) rather than Trump himself.   A few years ago, I had a post on the trend of conservative hostility to educated people, and I'll return to the issue in the future.  

Thursday, October 22, 2026

Pretend he's on the ballot

 It's been a long time between posts, but I'll be back on a fairly regular schedule now.  The New York Times had a story by Nate Cohn on the upcoming midterm elections which noted Trump's low approval ratings.  It said "the president’s party almost always fares poorly in midterm elections, but especially when the president’s approval rating is low."  That sounds reasonable, but they didn't actually look at the relationship, so I will.  If you regress the number of seats held by the president's party in the House of Representatives after the elections on the number held before and the president's approval rating in October (1946-2022 midterms), you get:

Constant     -59.4
                   (45.0)

Before           0.91
                     (0.13)

Approval      107.5
                      (46.7)

The predicted value for the 2026 elections is 177 Republican seats, which is below most other forecasts (the consensus seems to be a little over 200).  Looking more closely:


The most encouraging example for the Republicans is 2022, when the Democrats lost only a few seats even though Biden  had low approval ratings.  Probably that was partly due to negative polarization--there were people who had negative views of Biden but just wouldn't vote for a Republican.  That undoubtedly still applies today, although in the other direction.  The residual for that election is +28, so if that applies in 2026 it brings us near the consensus forecast.  But of course, there were idiosyncratic features of the 2022 elections that don't apply today.  Also, I suspect that the linkage between presidential approval and midterm results is becoming stronger (ie, people make less distinction between the president and his party).  So I'll guess a residual of +10 or +15, giving the Republicans about 190 seats.  


Saturday, September 26, 2026

I don't need no doctor, part 2

 In August, I had a post about confidence in Anthony Fauci to provide reliable information on the coronavirus.  In March 2020, it was high among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.  After that, it dropped among Republicans and (less strongly) independents, but stayed the same or maybe increased a little among Democrats.  This one looks at confidence in Donald Trump:  


I show two lines for each party:  one is for surveys by the Kaiser Family Foundation, and the other is surveys by other organizations.   There is a downward trend among everyone, although the difference between the KFF and other surveys makes it hard to be sure about the exact size of the trend.  But it's clear that Republican and independent loss of confidence in Fauci was not accompanied by an increase of confidence in Trump.  In the last survey (March 2022), 18% of Republicans said they trusted him a great deal, 31% said a good deal, 32% not much, and 19% none at all.

Many accounts treat Trump's support as unshakeable--that as he once said, he could shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and wouldn't lose any voters.  But in terms of public support, he's not that different from other politicians:   he has a core of enthusiastic supporters, but also people who support him on some things but not others, and even some who don't think much of him but regard him as better than the alternatives.  In fact, although Trump has changed the Republican party, the Republican party (specifically, the right wing of the party) has changed Trump:  on issues where he was once seen as moderate or at least flexible, he's adopted right-wing positions.  On this one, he could have pivoted to talking about the success of Operation Warp Speed, but instead tried to appeal to anti-vaccine sentiment and continued to downplay the risk of Covid.  I think this helps to explain the decline of support in his second term--when things go wrong, he doesn't think of moving towards the center, but tries to generate more enthusiasm from his base.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]



Friday, September 18, 2026

How many more years?

 On September 11, Matthew Yglesias wrote that after the terrorist attacks 25 years before "trust in the federal government soared, temporarily reversing the secular increase in cynicism that’s been happening since Watergate and the decline of the three-network news oligopoly."  I've had several posts about long-term changes in trust in the government which suggested that the decline started earlier.  Those were based on the American National Election Studies, which only happen every two years, so they don't tell much about the influence of specific events.  But one of the ANES questions "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time"--was picked up by other organizations in the 1970s and asked pretty frequently.  It hasn't been asked since 2017--it's been replaced by questions including one or two additional categories for less than some of the time--but it still covers 60 years.   

Here is the percent who choose most or almost all of the time


It peaked in 1962, then declined steadily throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  After that, there were ups and downs, but more downs:  all/most responses didn't fall below 20% until 1993, but were pretty consistently below 20% in 2013-17.  9/11 had a big impact, but it didn't last:  in July 2003, after initial success in the Iraq war, 36% chose all or most, which put it about equal with November 1974, when the economy was in a recession and Gerald Ford had recently issued an unpopular pardon of Richard Nixon.

So the major story is of a general downward trend that started well before Watergate and the decline of network news.  I think that the underlying cause is the growth of education and the mass media, which led to a decline of deference:  people became less likely to assume that government officials knew better than they did.  Of course, these were long-term developments, but in the 1960s there was a cascade effect--the media became more critical, so people became more confident in expressing any negative views they might have, so people were surrounded by a more negative climate of opinion.  

Taking a closer look, here is the percent who choose "almost always".   Most of the surveys also recorded some volunteered "never" or "almost never" responses.   There is probably some additional variation because of differences among survey organizations, but the general pattern is clear:  the decline in confidence continued after the 1970s


I've mentioned before that the public mood seemed to become negative in the first half of the 1990s.  It's not clear why--there was a recession in 1991-2, but it wasn't that severe and the decline in confidence continued after it was over.  It's also not clear why confidence grew in the late 1990s:  the economy did well, but the main political events were the attempt to remove Bill Clinton from office and the the appearance of standoffs over debt limits, which seem like they should have had a negative impact.  But in any case, the experience of the 1990s may have some lessons for today.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]