The (roughly) three percent

At one time, it was often said that almost all Americans thought of themselves as part of the middle class, regardless of their actual economic circumstances.  It turned out that when asked if they belonged to the "middle class" or "working class," about half chose middle class and half chose working class--this is still true, despite the social and economic changes since the question was first asked more than 80 years ago.  But this post isn't primarily about either the middle class or working class:  it's about the people who say they are "upper class" if that option is offered.  They are a very small minority--usually less than 5%--so they are generally ignored or lumped in with the middle class.  But one of the surveys that includes the upper class option is the General Social Survey, and over the years they have accumulated a fairly large number of them (about 2,500).*

The figure shows party identification (proportion Republican minus proportion Democratic) by class in the GSS data.  For the lower, middle, and working class, the changes are pretty much parallel--more exactly, they have the same shape but slightly different slopes, so they have converged.  In the 20th century, Democratic identification was highest in the lower class and lowest in the middle class, with the working class in the middle, but now it's almost the same in all three.  The upper class has followed a different path--unlike the other classes, it's been moving towards the Democrats in the 21st century.  Because of small numbers in the individual samples, it's not possible to say much about the exact timing--the smoothed line shows it starting around 2000, but you could argue that it was a more sudden change that started later, somewhere around 2010.  But there's definitely been a change--in 2021, 2022, and 2024 samples Democratic identification has been highest in the upper class.  

I can think of two possible explanations.  One is that the images of the parties have changed:  Republicans are seen as less sympathetic to the upper class and/or Democrats are seen as more sympathetic, so people who regard themselves as part of the upper class are less likely to see the Republicans as the party that will serve their interests.  The other possibility is that the way that people who say they are part of the upper class see themselves has changed:  they're more likely to see their position as partly a matter of "privilege" or luck, and therefore more likely to think that the public interest is different from their class interest.  

Who are these people who think of themselves as part of the upper class?  When the GSS began, income, education, and occupational prestige were about equally important.  Over the time since then, income has become more important relative to the other two factors--about 4 or 5 times as important in recent years.  That is, the (self-identified) upper class used to be people with high incomes, high levels of education, and professional jobs; now it's closer to being just people with high incomes.  I think this makes the first potential explanation less plausible:  Republican criticism of "elites" is directed at educated people and people in professional occupations, but not at people with high incomes.  Morever, the extent to which the Republican party serves the immediate interests of high-income people has increased:  in the 1970s and 1980s, they sometimes accepted higher taxes on high-incomes as an unfortunate necessity; since then, support for tax cuts on high incomes has become an absolute.   That leaves the second possibility, which is consistent with these data and has support from other data.  

*It also includes "lower class" as an option--it's chosen by about 6%.

Misdiagnosis

 Last week, the New York Times published the transcript of an interview with the the heading "Jay Bhattacharya, the N. I. H. Director, says authorities broke the public’s trust in the Covid era. Now it’s up to outsiders to restore it."  In the course of the interview, Bhattacharya said "a Pew poll in 2024 that said 25 percent of Americans don’t believe that scientists have the best interest of the public at heart. One in four. And then people will come back to me — scientists — and say, 'Well, look, 75 percent trust us.'  That’s too low a bar, Ross [the interviewer was Ross Douthat]. It needs to be 100 percent. . . . If only 75 percent of the public thinks that the work that the N.I.H. does benefits them, it’s an utter failure."  

His memory was accurate:  the survey asked "How much confidence, if any, do you have in each of the following to act in the best interests of the public? A great deal, a fair amount, not too much, no confidence at all"  For "scientists," it was 26%, 51%, 19% ,4%; for "medical scientists" it was 30%, 48%, 18%, and 4%.  How does that compare to other groups?  To make the comparison easier, I'll combine the first two categories:

The military                       78%
Medical scientists              78%
Scientists                           77%
Police officers                    73%
Public school principals    72%
Religious leaders               55%
Journalists                          45%
Business leaders                40%
Elected officials                 33%

2024 wasn't the only time that the question was asked--it was also asked a number of times beginning in 2016 and again in 2025.  The figure shows the average for four groups with relatively high confidence:  medical scientists, military, police, and principals.*

All of them followed a similar course, with a drop from 2020 to 2021, and stability since then.  You could say that trust in medical science declined "in the Covid era," but it didn't happen until vaccines were available and things were opening up (the 2020 survey was in November and the 2021 survey was in December).  That is, the "lockdowns"** and closures than Bhattacharya criticizes didn't damage public confidence in medical science:  it was higher in November 2020 than it had been in January 2019.  

The Pew report on the 2025 survey gives a breakdown of confidence in medical scientists by partisanship.  Among Democrats, it's stayed about the same; among Republicans, it dropped between 2020 and 2021 and has not recovered--not even in 2025.  Later in the interview, Bhattacharya unwittingly explains why Republican confidence didn't increase once Trump was back in office.  Douthat says that RFK Jr is "comfortable saying something positive about some vaccines, but he’s not a salesman for vaccines."  Bhattacharya replies "I think we’ve had enough of salesmen. . . .  if I had the choice between someone like the former head of H.H.S., who was not a doctor either and was much more in this politician salesman mode, or Bobby, I think Bobby will ultimately be better for American public health."  Republican confidence in medical scientists has fallen because leading Republican politicians, especially Trump, have been "salesmen" for suspicion of vaccines and medical authorities in general.  If they now turned and said that the vaccines recommended by their team of experts was really essential, Republican confidence might rebound.  But if it's just Dr Bhattacharya saying that "world public health agrees with this,"  he's appealing to the same sentiment (trust in medical experts) that Republican leaders have undermined.  

*Confidence in "scientists" was very similar to confidence in "medical scientists," so I omit it to make the figure more readable.

**The measures in the United States didn't meet the dictionary definition of  "lockdown," but that's the word he uses.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Words, words, words

 A few days ago, Megan McArdle had a column objecting to descriptions of Trump as a fascist, not necessarily because they are wrong, but because "when ordinary people hear 'Trump is a fascist,' they aren’t primed for an academic debate over when right-wing populism shades over into fascism; they hear you saying that Trump is either an adherent of the political ideology known as fascism or a dictator whose practices are fascist."  That is, calling Trump a fascist will reduce your credibility because even people who have negative feelings about him will regard the charge as overstated.  Shortly before the 2024 election, an ABC News survey asked a question which was introduced with "A fascist often is defined as a political extremist who seeks to act as a dictator, disregards individual rights and threatens or uses force against their opponents," and then asked if Kamala Harris was a fascist, Trump was a fascist, both were, or neither were.  16% said only Harris was, 42% only Trump, 6% both, and 33% neither.  Putting it together, 48% of those surveyed thought that Trump was a fascist and 22% thought that Harris was.  

The ABC survey gave people a definition of fascism; in May 1945 a Gallup poll asked people to give their own.  They classified the answers into groups--they didn't give them labels, but illustrated them with examples of things that people had said.  The biggest group, at 37%, included "nothing," "not interested," and "can't explain."  Second, at 28%, included "dictatorship," "totalitarianism," and "one man rule."  Third, at 11%, included "Nazism," "Hitler," and "Mussolini."  Fourth, at 8%, included "hoodlum regime," "against everything," and "evil."  The second group can be regarded as correct answers.  The third is ambiguous:  they apply the term correctly, but don't demonstrate any understanding of the principle behind it.  The fourth is just a negative characterization.  My overall classification is:

                             All              College grads       

Correct                 32%                 65%
Vague                   23%                 18%
Wrong                   4%                    3%
Don't Know         37%                  10%
Miscellaneous      4%                      2%

Correct answers include the second group and some smaller ones; vague is the third and fourth plus some smaller ones; don't know is the first group, and "Socialism and Communism; a red" is counted as wrong.     The survey also asked "Are there any individuals, organizations, parties or other groups in this country which seem to you to be at least partly fascist in their aims or interests?" 29% said yes, 29% no, and 43% didn't know.  Of course, people in 1945 had less formal education than they do today, but they also had more direct experience with fascism. 

Taken together, the surveys suggest that most people understand "fascist" term in only a vague sense:  that someone is really bad or wants to be a dictator.   It's only educated elites like McArdle (BA, Penn; MBA, Chicago) and me who worry about the precise definition.   McArdle does touch on a valid point:  that people often act as if words have a magical power.   I remember that in 2016 some people seemed to think that if the media would just say "racist" or "lies" then Trump's support would disappear; now "fascist" is supposed to do the trick.  If you want to influence public opinion, talking about specific things that Trump has done will have more impact than calling him a fascist.   But then there's the question of whether the public will be allowed to express its opinion:  I think it's unlikely that the November 2026 election will be cancelled or delayed, but there's a good chance that there will be attempts to interfere with the casting or counting of votes.  That's the real importance of the debate over whether Trump is a fascist.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

What could happen here, part 4

In my last post, I gave some evidence that many people aren't attached to core principles of democracy (see also this post).*   However, people are strongly attached to some of the particular features of American democracy.  In 2004, a survey asked:   "If there were a terrorist attack in the United States near the November election, should we postpone the election because that would not be a good time to be deciding who should lead the country? Or, should we go ahead with the election because postponing would be a victory for the terrorists?" Only 10% said that we should postpone the election, while 86% said we should go ahead.  And in April 2020:  "If the coronavirus outbreak persists through November, would you support postponing the election, moving to all-mail balloting, or proceeding as normal?"  18% favored postponing, 53% all-mail balloting, and 26% proceeding as normal.  That is, few people supported postponing elections even in an emergency.  

Attachment to tradition can be an barrier to reforms like direct election of the president or multi-member districts for Congress.  But it can also be a barrier to things that would be harmful to a democratic system, as in this case.**

This leads to a question that I've touched on, but not addressed directly:  is the Trump movement fascist?  I would say no, for two reasons.  First, Fascism was clear about rejecting both democracy and tradition:  it was about the future.  Second, Fascism took the military as a model:  according to The Doctrine of Fascism (attributed to Mussolini although partly written by Giovanni Gentile), "the individual in the Fascist state is . . . multiplied, just in the same way that a soldier in a regiment is not diminished but rather increased by the number of his comrades... [the individual] is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom, but retains what is essential..."  Trump  hasn't made any attempt to organize his supporters along military lines--all he asks is that people praise him and buy his merchandise.  With January 6, there doesn't seem to have been any central organization--it was just a matter of gathering a mob and (as Trump likes to say) "we'll see what happens."  Trump also doesn't openly reject democracy or the American political tradition, but claims to be defending them.  So the movement continues to get support from people who see it as basically traditional American conservatism, just with a different style. 

A practical implication is that there is a chance to get some Republicans to break with Trump on specific issues--for example, Indiana Republicans rejected his demands to redistrict.  It wasn't just a few either:  21 of the 40 Republicans in the state Senate voted no.  I haven't seen anything on why Indiana Republicans acted differently than Republicans in other states, but there have to be some lessons there.  

*Also this question from 2002: "When it comes to protecting the country from terrorism, some people say it's more important to ensure people's constitutional rights, even if it means that some suspected terrorists are never found. Others say it's more important to find every potential terrorist, even if some innocent people are seriously hurt. Which is closer to your view?"  Opinion was almost evenly divided, with 44% saying it was more important to protect constitutional rights and 47% saying it was more important to to find every potential terrorist.  

**Elections have been postponed with no lasting harm, as in Britain during the Second World War. But doing it creates the possibility of a slippery slope.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

What could happen here, part 3

 A few days ago, Bret Stephens wrote that American democracy will survive "because most Americans, including most Republicans, remain faithfully wedded to a democratic system. "  It's true that an overwhelming majority of Americans are committed to a democratic system in the sense of believing that governments should be selected by voters choosing from competing parties.  But as I've observed before, people aren't necessarily committed to the things that are needed to make a democratic system work.  For example, in the 1950s several surveys asked whether it was "more important to find out all the Communists in this country, even if some innocent people are accused--or is it more important to protect people who might be innocent, even if some Communists are not found out?"  Solid majorities said it was more important to find out all the Communists (e. g. 64% in January 1956).  There were also questions about whether the Socialist Party, which was fully committed to electoral democracy, should be allowed to publish newspapers.  Opinion was pretty evenly divided--the last time it was asked, 43% said yes, 5% gave a qualified yes, 39% said no, and 13% didn't know.   So maybe people were wedded to a democratic system, but many of them weren't all that faithful.  But political elites generally didn't try to appeal to the potential anti-democratic sentiments.  This was partly because of the Constitution and the legal system--it was pointless to advocate banning Socialist newspapers when that was going to be rejected by the courts--but partly because elites of both parties were more consistent than the general public in their commitment to democratic principles.  This is still true to some extent--for example, if Trump said we should cancel or delay the 2026 elections, he might get substantial support among Republican voters, but I'm confident (OK, pretty confident) that almost all Republicans in Congress would still oppose it.  However, there are many ways in which the system can be altered in ways that make it harder for those who disagree with the administration to operate, and here is where there's been a change.  Republican political elites accept or even defend things that were once considered off-limits, like mid-decade redrawing of Congressional districts, or selective denial of funds to disfavored states or organizations.*  If the process continues, the result will be an increasingly unbalanced system, where we still have regular elections offering a choice between parties, but it becomes harder for the Democrats to win and to implement their policies when they do have office.    

*See this article on Trump's actions against Colorado.  A revealing passage:  "Some Colorado Republicans blame the state’s Democratic leaders for provoking Mr. Trump’s wrath."

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Who wanted war?

 A couple of days ago, Christopher Caldwell wrote "Republicans trusted Mr. Trump to take over their stumbling party in large part because he cursed the George W. Bush administration for having led the country into the Iraq war with a bunch of specious talking points about weapons of mass destruction."   Today a New York Times news story said "Mr. Trump won the presidency in 2016 in part by rejecting nation-building and foreign wars."  This seems wrong to me--Trump has always been clear that he has no objection to war as long as it's profitable.  I searched the Trump Twitter Archive through 2016 and found nothing objecting to the original rationales for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but lots of complaints that we were spending money and not getting Iraqi oil.  

A Pew survey in September 2015 asked Republicans about a hypothetical candidate for the party's nomination who "wants to send US ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria."  Among people who favored Trump, 56% said they would be more likely to support such a candidate and 26% that they would be more likely to oppose one; among people who favored someone else, it was 52% more likely to support and 26% more likely to oppose (the rest said it wouldn't make much difference to them).  That is, opinions about sending ground troops to fight ISIS were unrelated to Republican candidate preference.  

This question was part of a series.  Two of the other items--"wants to end the nuclear agreement with Iran" and "will compromise with members of the Democratic Party" were also unrelated to the choice between Trump and other candidates.   Three others were related.  One was "wants to deport all immigrants living in the US illegally."   Among Trump supporters, 51% said they would be more likely to support such a candidate and 18% that they'd be more likely to oppose; among supporters of other candidates, it was 36% and 39%.  Another was "wants to end federal funding for Planned Parenthood."  Among Trump supporters, 42% more likely to support and 27% less likely; among supporters of other candidates, it was 57% to 20%.  Finally, on "wants to raise taxes on wealthy Americans," 44% of Trump supporters said they would be more likely to support and 24% to oppose; among supporters of other candidates, it was 30% to support and 39% oppose.  That is, Trump supporters were more in favor of a hard line on immigration, but more moderate on Planned Parenthood and taxes on wealthy people.

It's often said that Trump has achieved a takeover, sometimes even a "hostile takeover," of the Republican party.  But it's actually gone in both directions:  he's moved the party towards his position on some issues (especially immigration and tariffs) but has adopted orthodox Republican positions on others where he once seemed to be more moderate (taxes, abortion, "our always under siege Second Amendment").  Between his first and second terms, Trump also has taken up some previously fringe positions on the right, like unbridled hostility to colleges and universities, and introduced them into the mainstream. 

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research] 

Guilty men (and women)

In 2016, Donald Trump lost the popular vote to a weak candidate, although the mysterious workings of the Electoral College gave him the presidency.  During his first term, he never reached a 50% approval rating.  In the 2020 election, despite having the advantage of incumbency, he lost both the popular and electoral votes to a mediocre candidate.  So why did the Republicans ignore this record of failure and nominate him again in 2024?  Most observers seem to think that the answer is obvious--it was because he had a strong hold on ordinary Republican voters.  

After the 2020 election, there were a number of surveys that asked if you wanted Trump to run again in 2024.  I compared the results for similar surveys about Gore running in 2004 and Kerry running in 2008. 

The years in the x-axis are 1 for the first year after he lost, 2 for the second, etc.  The y-axis is percent saying yes minus percent saying no.  Trump is consistently below Gore, and about the same as Kerry.  That is, he didn't have an especially large base of support among the voters.  

 These figures are based on the whole population, but some surveys limited the question to supporters of  the candidate's party.*  

Compared to Gore and Kerry, Trump looks stronger within his own party.  But another losing Republican candidate, Romney, got about the same results as Trump, suggesting that maybe Republicans generally are more willing to consider second chances.**  In any case, Trump's value of +30 means that about 35% of Republicans didn't want him to run again, and wanting someone to run again doesn't necessarily mean that you will support him.   So there was definitely an opening for other candidates.  

Turning from voters to elites, here are endorsements from Republican senators and governors (data from Ballotpedia).  

Trump announced his candidacy after the 2022 elections, and within a few days picked up his first endorsement (from Tommy Tuberville). Then there was a cluster in early 2023, and some more in April.  By April 17, he had 10.  Then other candidates got some endorsements, and by June 21st the gap had narrowed:  10 for Trump, 6 for others.  After that, Trump pulled ahead:  32 endorsed him before the Iowa caucuses, six more before the New Hampshire primaries, and another 10 before Nikki Haley dropped out.  Out of a total of 76 governors and senators, 44 endorsed Trump and  only 11 endorsed other candidates (four of those endorsed Trump after their first choice dropped out, so 48 endorsed Trump before the race was settled).  

My overall conclusion is that "the base" didn't impose Trump on Republican elites; Republican elites asked for him.  That leads back to my original point about Trump's poor record in general elections--why would professional politicians want a weak candidate at the top of the ticket?  One possibility is that they thought his electoral record was actually a good one--I can imagine an argument along those lines.  Another, and more disturbing, possibility is that they looked at the candidates and thought that Trump would be the best one to lead the country.  

*Partisan breakdowns could be found or calculated for some of the surveys of the general public, but I'll leave that to someone who has a research assistant to do the work.

**This seems plausible to me--my impression is that when Democrats lose, they blame their candidates; when Republicans lose, they blame outside forces (especially the media).

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]