There have been a lot of stories saying that the "yellow vest" movement, Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump are all examples of populism. For example, Ross Douthat says "the populists theoretically hold the White House, under a president who promised to be a traitor to his class. . . [but] his administration’s policy agenda has been steered by the Republican Party’s business elite rather than by the voters who elected him." Actually, the voters who elected Trump were pretty much the same people who voted for Mitt Romney, and they got the policies that they presumably wanted--tax cuts and less regulation of business. I've had several posts pointing out that people didn't see Trump as different from other Republicans in terms of caring about the middle class or "people like you," but here is one more:
Who do you think would do more to advance the interests of ......
Wealthy
2012 2016
D 24% 25%
R 65% 65%
Both/Neither, DK 11% 10%
Middle Class
D 51% 50%
R 42% 40%
Both/Neither, DK 7% 11%
Working Class
D 51%
R 41%
Both/Neither, DK 8%
That is, in class terms people saw the Clinton/Trump choice as just like the Obama/Romney choice: by a large margin, they thought that the Republican candidate would do more for wealthy people, and by a smaller margin they thought the Democrat would do more for the middle class (they didn't ask about the working class in 2012, but Clinton had the edge in advancing the interests of the working class in 2016). Trump did better among less educated voters than Romney had, but there is no sign that it's because they expected him to pay particular attention to the working and middle classes.
In most European nations, there is a strong consensus among political elites--left of center on social issues right of center on economics, and in favor of the European Union (including the "ever-closer union" goal). More exactly, the economic consensus involves concern about budget deficits, reducing labor market regulation, and limiting the growth of "entitlements." These principles get support from the mainstream parties of both the left and the right, but they are not all that popular with the public. Populist movements arise in opposition to this consensus, but they suffer from a lack of capable leadership, so they haven't been effective.
In the United States, there is not a consensus among political elites: it makes a difference which party wins. As a result, you don't get populist movements of general opposition to the elite--political energy is channeled into partisan conflict. This is related to my previous post, which was about the tax-limitation movement of the 1970s. At that time, there was more of an elite consensus--this was the time of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's "professionalization of reform." Some of the reforms were popular (like environmental protection) but some weren't (the stronger forms of affirmative action), and the increase in taxes needed to pay for new programs definitely wasn't. The result was movements like Proposition 13 and the anti-busing movement. The Republicans absorbed their influence and shifted to the right, so the ideological gap between the parties increased. So the underlying difference is that American parties have been more open to "permeation" than European ones have been.
Ironically, in one sense the results have been similar. European political elites have lost support because they have resisted the influence of popular opinion. American political elites have lost support because of political conflict.
PS: Fareed Zakaria had a column today in which he offered what he regarded as reasons for optimism about developments in Europe. I would summarize it by saying he thinks that European political elites have ignored popular opinion in the past and will be able to do it again. A few quotes: "[Macron] has a five-year term, his party controls the legislature, and most analysts agree that his reforms are inevitable if France is to compete for investment and generate growth. . . . In Italy, the new coalition government had introduced a populist budget that promised a universal basic income and early retirement, only to meet the steely opposition of the E.U. And it was the populists who blinked. . . [in Britain] the basic story is that every time the country comes close to actual Brexit, it pulls back, appalled by the costs."
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
No comments:
Post a Comment