In the last couple of months, there has been a lot of discussion of the 1994 crime bill, mostly saying that it started or accelerated a trend to mass incarceration. I was going to write about that, but several stories in the last few days have made the point I was going to make, which was that the rate of imprisonment started to rise in the mid-1970s, and the most rapid increase occurred before 1994 (see this article and more discussion and statistics here).
So instead I'll go back to the time when it actually started. In 1973, the Gallup Poll asked: "The governor of a state has proposed that all sellers of hard drugs such as heroin be given life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?" 71% of the people with an opinion said they approved (only 4% had no opinion).
Support was strong among both Republicans (77%) and Democrats (68%). It was a little lower among college graduates (62%) and younger people (59% among people aged 26 and under). It was also somewhat lower in New England (57%) and the Middle Atlantic (67%). The regional differences are interesting, because the governor in question was probably Nelson Rockefeller--New York soon did pass a law that was not quite as draconian as the proposal in the Gallup question, but pretty severe. There were no clear differences between residents of urban and rural areas. Finally, there were differences by race: 72% of whites, 66% of black women, and 55% of black men, said that they approved (the interaction between race and gender is statistically significant).
Although there are some group differences, and they are all in the direction you'd expect, they were not that large, and a majority of every group I looked at was in favor of the proposal.
[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
Tuesday, April 12, 2016
Sunday, April 3, 2016
Who and when?
Recently a number of people have claimed that anti-black prejudice is a key factor in support for Donald Trump: for example, Sean McElwee and Philip Cohen and Matthew Yglesias (thanks to my esteemed friend Robert Biggert for the references). I'd been skeptical of this in the past, but after looking at the data in the 2016 American National Election Studies Pilot Survey, I have to agree that it's true. For example, ratings of the relative laziness of blacks and whites predicts support for Trump almost as well as position on how many immigrants should be allowed into the country.
But why is Trump popular now? Anti-black prejudice doesn't change much from year to year, but this race for the Republican nomination is a lot different from the ones that preceded it (remember how people used to say that the Republicans always chose the person who'd finished second last time?). Another way to look at it is to consider only people who don't display anti-black prejudice. In the ANES, Trump gets 49% of the preferences among people rate blacks as lazier than whites, and only 30% among people who see no difference, but 30% still puts him in first place in that group, well ahead of the combined totals of the next two (Cruz and Rubio).*
Even setting Trump aside, there are some unusual things about this contest. One is the strong showing of Ben Carson--although he eventually faded, he held up remarkably well considering his lack of experience, weak organization, and generally casual approach to campaigning. Another is the uniform failure of the "establishment" candidates: Scott Walker, Jeb Bush, Chris Cristie, Marco Rubio, and maybe a few others who I'm forgetting now. Of course, you could say that they were just weak candidates, and I'd agree about some of them, but only a year ago a lot of people were talking about the "deep bench" that the Republicans had.
So although race helps to explain who supports Trump, I don't think it explains why there's a lot of support for Trump (or someone like him) now. To explain that, I would turn to an issue I've written about before: negative attitudes towards the government. The ANES has a number of questions that can be used to form an index of confidence in the federal government since 1952, and 2012 was the lowest ever. The previous lows were in the 1970s and 1992-6, when there were strong insurgent movements from the right (Reagan's challenge to Gerald Ford in 1976, and surprising showings by Pat Buchanan in 1992 and 1996). That is, outsiders from the right tend to do well when confidence in "Washington" is low.
Although no one has asked the whole set of questions since 2012, one of them "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right," has been asked in several surveys, and the downward trend seems to be continuing. Hopefully the final ANES survey will ask all of them, and my guess is that the overall score will match or surpass the 2012 low.
*This is based on two five-point scales, one asking people to rate blacks and another asking them to rate whites.
But why is Trump popular now? Anti-black prejudice doesn't change much from year to year, but this race for the Republican nomination is a lot different from the ones that preceded it (remember how people used to say that the Republicans always chose the person who'd finished second last time?). Another way to look at it is to consider only people who don't display anti-black prejudice. In the ANES, Trump gets 49% of the preferences among people rate blacks as lazier than whites, and only 30% among people who see no difference, but 30% still puts him in first place in that group, well ahead of the combined totals of the next two (Cruz and Rubio).*
Even setting Trump aside, there are some unusual things about this contest. One is the strong showing of Ben Carson--although he eventually faded, he held up remarkably well considering his lack of experience, weak organization, and generally casual approach to campaigning. Another is the uniform failure of the "establishment" candidates: Scott Walker, Jeb Bush, Chris Cristie, Marco Rubio, and maybe a few others who I'm forgetting now. Of course, you could say that they were just weak candidates, and I'd agree about some of them, but only a year ago a lot of people were talking about the "deep bench" that the Republicans had.
So although race helps to explain who supports Trump, I don't think it explains why there's a lot of support for Trump (or someone like him) now. To explain that, I would turn to an issue I've written about before: negative attitudes towards the government. The ANES has a number of questions that can be used to form an index of confidence in the federal government since 1952, and 2012 was the lowest ever. The previous lows were in the 1970s and 1992-6, when there were strong insurgent movements from the right (Reagan's challenge to Gerald Ford in 1976, and surprising showings by Pat Buchanan in 1992 and 1996). That is, outsiders from the right tend to do well when confidence in "Washington" is low.
Although no one has asked the whole set of questions since 2012, one of them "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right," has been asked in several surveys, and the downward trend seems to be continuing. Hopefully the final ANES survey will ask all of them, and my guess is that the overall score will match or surpass the 2012 low.
*This is based on two five-point scales, one asking people to rate blacks and another asking them to rate whites.
Monday, March 28, 2016
Unsolicited advice
This is inspired by a post by Ross Douthat on talk of running a third-party candidate if Donald Trump is the Republican nominee, with the goal of throwing the election into the House of Representatives. This would require winning some states that the Democrats would otherwise have won, which rules out a "movement conservative." Some people have proposed trying to do it through the Libertarian party, but Douthat points out that Libertarians have traditionally done better in the Mountain west, and that winning places like Wyoming or Idaho is going to take electoral votes away from Trump, not Clinton or Sanders. So what's left? Nobody asked me, but here's my advice.
Since 1980, the third-party candidates who have received the largest share of votes were John Anderson in 1980, Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996, and Ralph Nader in 2000. Although they represented quite different ideologies, there was a positive correlation between the state-level share of the vote for each one--that is, if one third-party candidate did well in a state, all third-party candidates did well. Here is a scatterplot of vote for Anderson in 1980 and Perot in 1996, which was the weakest of the correlations. There is a definite relationship: for example, Vermont (in the upper right) was a relatively good state for both Anderson and Perot, while Alabama (lower left) was a poor one.
I did a factor analysis to get a score which can be interpreted as disposition to support third-party candidates. The top-scoring states were Maine, Alaska, Vermont, Rhode Island, Montana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Oregon. In 2012, those states had a combined total of 56 electoral votes, 50 of which went to Obama. So if a candidate won these states, there would be a decent chance of preventing the Democrat from getting a majority of the electoral votes.
But do those states have anything in common? I think Alaska and Montana are distinctive, but that the New England states plus Minnesota and Oregon share "good government" traditions, the sort of thing that was associated with moderate Republicanism back when moderate Republicans roamed the earth. So the most promising strategy for people who want to throw the election into the House of Representatives would be to run a moderate Republican, maybe someone like the former Senator from Maine, Olympia Snowe. If supporting an avowed moderate was too much for them, maybe they could call the candidate a "Reform Conservative."
[Note: it was surprisingly difficult to get data on vote shares by state in a convenient form. I finally found spreadsheets going all the way back to 1828, compiled by Stephen Wolf.]
Since 1980, the third-party candidates who have received the largest share of votes were John Anderson in 1980, Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996, and Ralph Nader in 2000. Although they represented quite different ideologies, there was a positive correlation between the state-level share of the vote for each one--that is, if one third-party candidate did well in a state, all third-party candidates did well. Here is a scatterplot of vote for Anderson in 1980 and Perot in 1996, which was the weakest of the correlations. There is a definite relationship: for example, Vermont (in the upper right) was a relatively good state for both Anderson and Perot, while Alabama (lower left) was a poor one.
I did a factor analysis to get a score which can be interpreted as disposition to support third-party candidates. The top-scoring states were Maine, Alaska, Vermont, Rhode Island, Montana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Oregon. In 2012, those states had a combined total of 56 electoral votes, 50 of which went to Obama. So if a candidate won these states, there would be a decent chance of preventing the Democrat from getting a majority of the electoral votes.
But do those states have anything in common? I think Alaska and Montana are distinctive, but that the New England states plus Minnesota and Oregon share "good government" traditions, the sort of thing that was associated with moderate Republicanism back when moderate Republicans roamed the earth. So the most promising strategy for people who want to throw the election into the House of Representatives would be to run a moderate Republican, maybe someone like the former Senator from Maine, Olympia Snowe. If supporting an avowed moderate was too much for them, maybe they could call the candidate a "Reform Conservative."
[Note: it was surprisingly difficult to get data on vote shares by state in a convenient form. I finally found spreadsheets going all the way back to 1828, compiled by Stephen Wolf.]
Wednesday, March 23, 2016
Five imaginary surveys
Carl Morris offered three examples of poll results (see this post by Andrew Gelman for a link and discussion). The numbers are those who say they favor the candidate from Party A in a two-person race (no one is undecided). He adds that "Party A candidates have always gotten between 40% and 60% of the vote and have won about half of the elections."
15 out of 20 (75% for A)
115 out of 200 (57.5%)
1,046 out of 2000 (52.3%)
The p-value for the hypothesis that exactly half support candidate A is .021 for each example. But Morris argues that they provide different levels of evidence for the proposition that A is ahead: strongest for 1,046 out of 2000, then 115 out of 200, with 15 out of 20 giving the weakest evidence. For the explanation, read the original paper, but basically his point is given the experience of other elections, you should compare the pessimistic hypothesis ("I have just under 50%") to an alternative hypothesis that's consistent with that experience, like "I have more than 50% but less than 60%."
What if the poll showed support from 10,145 out of 20,000 (50.7%)? The p-value would again be .021, and Morris's approach would show even stronger evidence for the proposition that A was ahead than in the 1,046 out of 2,000 example. However, a candidate might reasonably find it less encouraging than 1046 out of 2000, and describe the results as indicating that the election was "too close to call." Morris's analysis and the p-value are both based on the assumption that you had a random sample. But in an election poll, you know that's not quite true--even if you contact a random sample (which is difficult), non-response is almost certainly not completely random. So in addition to sampling error, there is some extra uncertainty. It's hard to say exactly how much, but it's safe to say that it's at least 1-2%, even for high-profile races.
What if the poll showed support from 27 out of 30? The p-value is about .000004, and with a prior distribution like that used by Morris, the posterior probability that candidate A is ahead is very near one. That is, both agree that this provides stronger evidence than any of the other examples. But I think that a reasonable candidate would suspect that there was something wrong with the poll: that there was some kind of mistake or deception.
This is not to say that there's any mistake in Morris's analysis, just that things get more complicated as you get closer to the problems of interpreting actual results. These examples are also relevant to the situation faced by someone asking "does x affect y, after controlling for other relevant factors?" (e. g., does income affect chances of voting for Donald Trump?). You could divide the range of parameter estimates into four groups:
a. too small to be of interest
b. "normal" size
c. surprisingly large
d. ridiculously large
People often characterize (a) in terms of "substantive significance," but it can also be parallel to the uncertainty in even well-conducted surveys. In an observational study, the specification of "other relevant factors" is almost certainly wrong or incomplete, so if you have a very small parameter estimate, it's reasonable to suspect that it would be zero or the opposite sign under some reasonable alternative specifications--in effect, it's "too close to call." The second, (b) is the common situation in which the variable makes some difference, but not all that much--often it's one of a large number of factors. Establishing something like that may be an advance in knowledge, but usually isn't very exciting. A sufficiently large value (c) is different: it suggests we may have to fundamentally change the way we think about something (as I recall, people said things like that about the LaCour "study" of personal influence). Then there's (d), which could be a result of mistakes in recording the data, or miscoding, or some gross error in model specification (politeness prevents me from offering examples). The problem is that the values for (c) and (d) overlap--just like the 27 out of 30 example could indicate that the candidate is going to win by a historically unprecedented margin, or that there was merely some kind of mistake.
What if the poll showed support from 10,145 out of 20,000 (50.7%)? The p-value would again be .021, and Morris's approach would show even stronger evidence for the proposition that A was ahead than in the 1,046 out of 2,000 example. However, a candidate might reasonably find it less encouraging than 1046 out of 2000, and describe the results as indicating that the election was "too close to call." Morris's analysis and the p-value are both based on the assumption that you had a random sample. But in an election poll, you know that's not quite true--even if you contact a random sample (which is difficult), non-response is almost certainly not completely random. So in addition to sampling error, there is some extra uncertainty. It's hard to say exactly how much, but it's safe to say that it's at least 1-2%, even for high-profile races.
What if the poll showed support from 27 out of 30? The p-value is about .000004, and with a prior distribution like that used by Morris, the posterior probability that candidate A is ahead is very near one. That is, both agree that this provides stronger evidence than any of the other examples. But I think that a reasonable candidate would suspect that there was something wrong with the poll: that there was some kind of mistake or deception.
This is not to say that there's any mistake in Morris's analysis, just that things get more complicated as you get closer to the problems of interpreting actual results. These examples are also relevant to the situation faced by someone asking "does x affect y, after controlling for other relevant factors?" (e. g., does income affect chances of voting for Donald Trump?). You could divide the range of parameter estimates into four groups:
a. too small to be of interest
b. "normal" size
c. surprisingly large
d. ridiculously large
People often characterize (a) in terms of "substantive significance," but it can also be parallel to the uncertainty in even well-conducted surveys. In an observational study, the specification of "other relevant factors" is almost certainly wrong or incomplete, so if you have a very small parameter estimate, it's reasonable to suspect that it would be zero or the opposite sign under some reasonable alternative specifications--in effect, it's "too close to call." The second, (b) is the common situation in which the variable makes some difference, but not all that much--often it's one of a large number of factors. Establishing something like that may be an advance in knowledge, but usually isn't very exciting. A sufficiently large value (c) is different: it suggests we may have to fundamentally change the way we think about something (as I recall, people said things like that about the LaCour "study" of personal influence). Then there's (d), which could be a result of mistakes in recording the data, or miscoding, or some gross error in model specification (politeness prevents me from offering examples). The problem is that the values for (c) and (d) overlap--just like the 27 out of 30 example could indicate that the candidate is going to win by a historically unprecedented margin, or that there was merely some kind of mistake.
Monday, March 14, 2016
It was a very bad year?
A fact that will probably be mentioned a lot before November, especially if Hillary Clinton gets the Democratic nomination, is that inequality rose more during Bill Clinton's presidency than in did under George W. Bush, George H. W. Bush, Ronald Reagan, or Barack Obama, according to a standard measure (the Gini coefficient) calculated by the Census Bureau. Here's one example, which gives a link to the original numbers.
In s figure showing the Gini coefficient over the last 50 years, it's clear there was a change in the 1990s--more specifically, between 1992 and 1993, when it jumped from .433 to .454. The increase of .021 in that year was as big as the increase in the previous ten years and bigger than the increase in the next fifteen years.
What went wrong in 1993? The Excel table which you can find by following the link above has a number (23) by the year 1993. It doesn't give any indication of what that means, but an old Census report (P60-203) does:
"Data collection method changed from paper and pencil to computer-assisted interviewing. In addition, the Census Bureau revised the March 1994 income supplement to allow for the coding of different income amounts on selected questionnaire items. Limits either increased or decreased
in the following categories: earnings increased to $999,999, social security increased to $49,999, supplemental security income and public assistance increased to $24,999, veterans’ benefits increased to $99,999, child support and alimony decreased to $49,999."
The Census also reported average earnings for the five income quintiles and the top 5%. The biggest change in 1993 was the increased limit for top earnings, which had been $299,999 until then. Incomes in that range would be in the top 5%, so I estimated the Gini coefficient in 1967-92 by regressing it on the shares of the bottom four quintiles and the 80%-95% group (R-square=.97). The predicted and reported values from 1991-5 are:
Pred Reported residual
1991 .428 .428 .000
1992 .431 .433 .002
1993 .439 .454 .015
1994 .442 .456 .014
1995 .437 .450 .013
The comparison suggests that about two-thirds (.014/.021) of the reported increase in the Gini coefficient between 1992 and 1993 was a result of the increase in the limits to reported income. If the Gini coefficient is adjusted by subtracting .014 from all years starting in 1993, the figure is:
In s figure showing the Gini coefficient over the last 50 years, it's clear there was a change in the 1990s--more specifically, between 1992 and 1993, when it jumped from .433 to .454. The increase of .021 in that year was as big as the increase in the previous ten years and bigger than the increase in the next fifteen years.
What went wrong in 1993? The Excel table which you can find by following the link above has a number (23) by the year 1993. It doesn't give any indication of what that means, but an old Census report (P60-203) does:
"Data collection method changed from paper and pencil to computer-assisted interviewing. In addition, the Census Bureau revised the March 1994 income supplement to allow for the coding of different income amounts on selected questionnaire items. Limits either increased or decreased
in the following categories: earnings increased to $999,999, social security increased to $49,999, supplemental security income and public assistance increased to $24,999, veterans’ benefits increased to $99,999, child support and alimony decreased to $49,999."
The Census also reported average earnings for the five income quintiles and the top 5%. The biggest change in 1993 was the increased limit for top earnings, which had been $299,999 until then. Incomes in that range would be in the top 5%, so I estimated the Gini coefficient in 1967-92 by regressing it on the shares of the bottom four quintiles and the 80%-95% group (R-square=.97). The predicted and reported values from 1991-5 are:
Pred Reported residual
1991 .428 .428 .000
1992 .431 .433 .002
1993 .439 .454 .015
1994 .442 .456 .014
1995 .437 .450 .013
The comparison suggests that about two-thirds (.014/.021) of the reported increase in the Gini coefficient between 1992 and 1993 was a result of the increase in the limits to reported income. If the Gini coefficient is adjusted by subtracting .014 from all years starting in 1993, the figure is:
Saturday, March 5, 2016
The movement
In the fall, I had several posts on why conservatism became a "movement." I've been thinking about this issue off and on since then, and was reminded of it by a recent post from Paul Krugman. My explanation is:
1. A political tendency that has the major institutions of society on its side doesn't have to worry about doctrine--it can just appeal to "common sense." A political tendency that is excluded from the major institutions of society has to develop a doctrine and institutions to support an alternative vision. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, labor and socialist parties in Europe established a network of alternative institutions: newspapers, publishing houses, adult education classes, and even social clubs.
2. In the 1960s and 1970s, liberalism came to dominate education and and what was then called "the media" and what would now be called the "mainstream media." Now that conservatism was in opposition, it became a "movement." Since conservatism continued to be strong in business, it was a well-financed movement.
3. The shift in the political leaning of the media and higher education seems to have occurred in many or most economically developed nations, but the change of conservatism to a movement was unusually strong in the United States. Why? I proposed an explanation based on national differences in values, but it didn't fit the facts very well. Then it occurred to me that the difference might be political institutions: the system in the United States makes relatively easy for outsiders to mount challenges. In most countries, the party selects the candidates for parliament, and the parliamentary party selects its leader. That is, in order to get ahead you have to win the approval of people who are already on the inside. In the United States, you can mount a challenge, win a primary, and push your way in, as Marco Rubio did in 2010, Ted Cruz did in 2012, and Donald Trump is doing now. Successes help to sustain a movement.
4. This explanation raises a question: why have the successful challenges in recent years all come from the right? The things I talked about in points 1 and 2 apply to the minority who are deeply engaged in politics: most ordinary voters are not consistent conservatives or liberals. The image of taking a stand on principle has some popular appeal, but so does the image of not caring about ideology and being willing to compromise to get things done. So why don't Republican primaries see strong challenges from the center?
5. One factor is psychological: it's easier to be passionate about taking a stand on principle than it is to be passionate about considering all points of view and taking things on a case-by-case basis. Another is historical: the major advances of the Republican party since the 1970s have involved shifts to the right. There was Reagan in 1980, Gingrich and the "Contract with America" in 1994, and the Tea Party in 2010-4. So an ambitious newcomer (e. g., Marco Rubio) can reasonably conclude that the way to get ahead is to keep pushing to the right, and an insider who doesn't really care about ideology can conclude that "no enemies to the right" is the best policy.
I don't have any real evidence for it, but I think that the historical factor is more important than the psychological, so that pretty soon (maybe after the 2016 election) the moderates will start successfully pushing back. But I think that the more basic pattern in which conservatism is a movement and liberalism is a loose coalition, will endure for a while.
1. A political tendency that has the major institutions of society on its side doesn't have to worry about doctrine--it can just appeal to "common sense." A political tendency that is excluded from the major institutions of society has to develop a doctrine and institutions to support an alternative vision. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, labor and socialist parties in Europe established a network of alternative institutions: newspapers, publishing houses, adult education classes, and even social clubs.
2. In the 1960s and 1970s, liberalism came to dominate education and and what was then called "the media" and what would now be called the "mainstream media." Now that conservatism was in opposition, it became a "movement." Since conservatism continued to be strong in business, it was a well-financed movement.
3. The shift in the political leaning of the media and higher education seems to have occurred in many or most economically developed nations, but the change of conservatism to a movement was unusually strong in the United States. Why? I proposed an explanation based on national differences in values, but it didn't fit the facts very well. Then it occurred to me that the difference might be political institutions: the system in the United States makes relatively easy for outsiders to mount challenges. In most countries, the party selects the candidates for parliament, and the parliamentary party selects its leader. That is, in order to get ahead you have to win the approval of people who are already on the inside. In the United States, you can mount a challenge, win a primary, and push your way in, as Marco Rubio did in 2010, Ted Cruz did in 2012, and Donald Trump is doing now. Successes help to sustain a movement.
4. This explanation raises a question: why have the successful challenges in recent years all come from the right? The things I talked about in points 1 and 2 apply to the minority who are deeply engaged in politics: most ordinary voters are not consistent conservatives or liberals. The image of taking a stand on principle has some popular appeal, but so does the image of not caring about ideology and being willing to compromise to get things done. So why don't Republican primaries see strong challenges from the center?
5. One factor is psychological: it's easier to be passionate about taking a stand on principle than it is to be passionate about considering all points of view and taking things on a case-by-case basis. Another is historical: the major advances of the Republican party since the 1970s have involved shifts to the right. There was Reagan in 1980, Gingrich and the "Contract with America" in 1994, and the Tea Party in 2010-4. So an ambitious newcomer (e. g., Marco Rubio) can reasonably conclude that the way to get ahead is to keep pushing to the right, and an insider who doesn't really care about ideology can conclude that "no enemies to the right" is the best policy.
I don't have any real evidence for it, but I think that the historical factor is more important than the psychological, so that pretty soon (maybe after the 2016 election) the moderates will start successfully pushing back. But I think that the more basic pattern in which conservatism is a movement and liberalism is a loose coalition, will endure for a while.
Tuesday, March 1, 2016
Falsifiable predictions
I experimented with the model for predicting elections discussed in my last post. I couldn't exactly reproduce Norpoth's results, but the regression coefficients were about the same. Specifically, using the data from 1912 to 2012, the coefficient for the NH primary vote share was .463 for the incumbent party and -.172 for the opposition party, with standard errors of .075 and .053. The resulting predictions for the share of the two-party vote in November 2016:
Clinton vs. Trump: 39.8%
Clinton vs. Other: 45.0%
Sanders vs. Trump: 50.4%
Sanders vs Other: 55.6%
That is, Sanders is predicted to do about 10 percentage points better than Clinton, because he got about 61% of the top-two vote in New Hampshire and she got 39% (22 times .463=10.1). Sanders is predicted to win narrowly against Trump, while Clinton is predicted to lose in a McGovern/Goldwater type performance.
My basic problem with these predictions, setting aside any specific knowledge of the 2016 campaign, is that the predicted difference is implausibly large. I'd say that a reasonable value would be 2 or 3 percentage points, which would mean a coefficient between about .1 and .15. But that's just my intuition: the 99.9% confidence interval for the NH vote share of the incumbent party is (.216,.740). That is, the evidence of the data seems to be inconsistent with the parameter values that I proposed.
However, suppose we distinguish between the incumbent party with an incumbent president and the incumbent party with no incumbent. Then the parameter estimates are .350 for an incumbent party without an incumbent president and .551 for an incumbent president. .35 is still a lot bigger than what I proposed as a plausible value, but the standard error is .132. That is, the 95% confidence goes as low as 0.9, so values I find reasonable are consistent with the data.
You could start with the model of incumbent vs. opposition party and ask if the difference between incumbent party with and without incumbent president is statistically significant. No: the t-ratio for the interaction effect is only about 1.0. But you could start with a three-way division and ask if the difference between opposition party and incumbent party without an incumbent is statistically significant. No: the relevant t-ratio is about 1.5. Although the incumbent/opposition model fits better, the difference is minimal.
The reason that the confidence interval for an incumbent party without an incumbent president is wide is that it's an unusual situation--it's happened only eight times between 1912 and 2012--so the data doesn't tell us much. It seems to me that we should start by assuming that there is a difference between elections with and without an incumbent president. As an example, Jimmy Carter got 55.6 of the top-two Democratic vote in 1976. His share in 1980 was almost the same: 55.8. But the meaning was very different--in the first, it helped him to become the front-runner; in the second, it was a sign of trouble. If you're just one of a field of contenders, a win is a win; if you're the president, you should win by an overwhelming margin.
In any case, the 2016 election will tell us a lot about this issue, especially if Clinton gets the Democratic nomination.
Clinton vs. Trump: 39.8%
Clinton vs. Other: 45.0%
Sanders vs. Trump: 50.4%
Sanders vs Other: 55.6%
That is, Sanders is predicted to do about 10 percentage points better than Clinton, because he got about 61% of the top-two vote in New Hampshire and she got 39% (22 times .463=10.1). Sanders is predicted to win narrowly against Trump, while Clinton is predicted to lose in a McGovern/Goldwater type performance.
My basic problem with these predictions, setting aside any specific knowledge of the 2016 campaign, is that the predicted difference is implausibly large. I'd say that a reasonable value would be 2 or 3 percentage points, which would mean a coefficient between about .1 and .15. But that's just my intuition: the 99.9% confidence interval for the NH vote share of the incumbent party is (.216,.740). That is, the evidence of the data seems to be inconsistent with the parameter values that I proposed.
However, suppose we distinguish between the incumbent party with an incumbent president and the incumbent party with no incumbent. Then the parameter estimates are .350 for an incumbent party without an incumbent president and .551 for an incumbent president. .35 is still a lot bigger than what I proposed as a plausible value, but the standard error is .132. That is, the 95% confidence goes as low as 0.9, so values I find reasonable are consistent with the data.
You could start with the model of incumbent vs. opposition party and ask if the difference between incumbent party with and without incumbent president is statistically significant. No: the t-ratio for the interaction effect is only about 1.0. But you could start with a three-way division and ask if the difference between opposition party and incumbent party without an incumbent is statistically significant. No: the relevant t-ratio is about 1.5. Although the incumbent/opposition model fits better, the difference is minimal.
The reason that the confidence interval for an incumbent party without an incumbent president is wide is that it's an unusual situation--it's happened only eight times between 1912 and 2012--so the data doesn't tell us much. It seems to me that we should start by assuming that there is a difference between elections with and without an incumbent president. As an example, Jimmy Carter got 55.6 of the top-two Democratic vote in 1976. His share in 1980 was almost the same: 55.8. But the meaning was very different--in the first, it helped him to become the front-runner; in the second, it was a sign of trouble. If you're just one of a field of contenders, a win is a win; if you're the president, you should win by an overwhelming margin.
In any case, the 2016 election will tell us a lot about this issue, especially if Clinton gets the Democratic nomination.
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