Thursday, December 29, 2022

Out of the file drawer, part 2

 My last post was about data on perceptions of moral conditions from 1949 to 2022.  There is a clear decline over the period, but I wanted to go beyond that and consider questions like whether the decline was steady or concentrated in particular periods and whether it's something that continues today.  A simple starting point is a regression model with time and time squared (plus dummy variables for the different question) as predictors.  In this model, the squared term is statistically significant (t=2.3)--I tried a couple of higher order terms and they were not.  Another model has two linear terms for different periods--the best fit comes with the periods 1949-68 and 1969-2022.  Predicted values for the two model are shown in the figure:


Both models (which fit about equally well) indicate that the decline was larger in the early years, but the predictions diverge in recent years--according to the quadratic model, the low point came around 2007, and assessments have becoming more favorable since then; according to the spline model, the decline is continuing.  With both models, there is some correlation in the residuals--periods when the values are consistently above or below the predicted values.  So overall, I don't think it's possible to be sure about whether the decline has stopped, but it's clearly slowed down.

This connects to a point that I've made before--that views about people and society in general became more negative in the 1960s and 1970s, but haven't changed much in the last few decades.  So accounts which attribute the recent rise in political polarization to discontent about people or society or economic conditions don't fit the timing.  In principle, you could argue that there was some kind of delayed response--that discontent didn't start affecting political views until time had passed.  However, another possibility, which I find more convincing, is that polarization in the public is a reaction to political developments--that is, it started with elites.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]    


1 comment:

  1. Discontent started affecting political views when it started to matter that it would. Until the 1990s, the Democrats had mostly controlled Congress with substantial majorities since 1932. However as Democrats power has gradually declined to the point where both the House and the Senate are in regular contention, people formerly in the minority recognize that their political views, which were irrelevant before with the Democrats in firm control, now matter. IOW, why feel discontented and express discontent when it won't achieve anything? But as the balance of power gradually became more equal, expressing discontent really matters to the balance of power.

    Democrats' decline occurred because their positions became too extreme as the party was gradually co-opted by environmental interests. I live in a west coast state where the two senators frequently attack the resource industries that other states - and even in conservative areas of my state! - depend on for economic well being. Frankly it's astounding behavior - one group of Americans attempting to undermine the economy of another group of Americans. It's not hard to guess what people in the resource areas do in response: try to undermine anything they can to screw the west coast a****le states back.

    Furthermore, to protect their wealthy environmentalist funding, which abhors both growth and industry, Dems pitched the working man overboard. In walked a lot of non-union contractors to fill the gaps - creating the Trumpist working class. Where I live there are dozens of cranes towering over the city skyline. Construction work pays well - but probably less than half of it is union.

    I'm not advocating unions - far from it. My point is that Dems turned a major constituency over to Republicans because their environmental handlers refused to allow them to support it.

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