Words, words, words

 A few days ago, Megan McArdle had a column objecting to descriptions of Trump as a fascist, not necessarily because they are wrong, but because "when ordinary people hear 'Trump is a fascist,' they aren’t primed for an academic debate over when right-wing populism shades over into fascism; they hear you saying that Trump is either an adherent of the political ideology known as fascism or a dictator whose practices are fascist."  That is, calling Trump a fascist will reduce your credibility because even people who have negative feelings about him will regard the charge as overstated.  Shortly before the 2024 election, an ABC News survey asked a question which was introduced with "A fascist often is defined as a political extremist who seeks to act as a dictator, disregards individual rights and threatens or uses force against their opponents," and then asked if Kamala Harris was a fascist, Trump was a fascist, both were, or neither were.  16% said only Harris was, 42% only Trump, 6% both, and 33% neither.  Putting it together, 48% of those surveyed thought that Trump was a fascist and 22% thought that Harris was.  

The ABC survey gave people a definition of fascism; in May 1945 a Gallup poll asked people to give their own.  They classified the answers into groups--they didn't give them labels, but illustrated them with examples of things that people had said.  The biggest group, at 37%, included "nothing," "not interested," and "can't explain."  Second, at 28%, included "dictatorship," "totalitarianism," and "one man rule."  Third, at 11%, included "Nazism," "Hitler," and "Mussolini."  Fourth, at 8%, included "hoodlum regime," "against everything," and "evil."  The second group can be regarded as correct answers.  The third is ambiguous:  they apply the term correctly, but don't demonstrate any understanding of the principle behind it.  The fourth is just a negative characterization.  My overall classification is:

                             All              College grads       

Correct                 32%                 65%
Vague                   23%                 18%
Wrong                   4%                    3%
Don't Know         37%                  10%
Miscellaneous      4%                      2%

Correct answers include the second group and some smaller ones; vague is the third and fourth plus some smaller ones; don't know is the first group, and "Socialism and Communism; a red" is counted as wrong.     The survey also asked "Are there any individuals, organizations, parties or other groups in this country which seem to you to be at least partly fascist in their aims or interests?" 29% said yes, 29% no, and 43% didn't know.  Of course, people in 1945 had less formal education than they do today, but they also had more direct experience with fascism. 

Taken together, the surveys suggest that most people understand "fascist" term in only a vague sense:  that someone is really bad or wants to be a dictator.   It's only educated elites like McArdle (BA, Penn; MBA, Chicago) and me who worry about the precise definition.   McArdle does touch on a valid point:  that people often act as if words have a magical power.   I remember that in 2016 some people seemed to think that if the media would just say "racist" or "lies" then Trump's support would disappear; now "fascist" is supposed to do the trick.  If you want to influence public opinion, talking about specific things that Trump has done will have more impact than calling him a fascist.   But then there's the question of whether the public will be allowed to express its opinion:  I think it's unlikely that the November 2026 election will be cancelled or delayed, but there's a good chance that there will be attempts to interfere with the casting or counting of votes.  That's the real importance of the debate over whether Trump is a fascist.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

What could happen here, part 4

In my last post, I gave some evidence that many people aren't attached to core principles of democracy (see also this post).*   However, people are strongly attached to some of the particular features of American democracy.  In 2004, a survey asked:   "If there were a terrorist attack in the United States near the November election, should we postpone the election because that would not be a good time to be deciding who should lead the country? Or, should we go ahead with the election because postponing would be a victory for the terrorists?" Only 10% said that we should postpone the election, while 86% said we should go ahead.  And in April 2020:  "If the coronavirus outbreak persists through November, would you support postponing the election, moving to all-mail balloting, or proceeding as normal?"  18% favored postponing, 53% all-mail balloting, and 26% proceeding as normal.  That is, few people supported postponing elections even in an emergency.  

Attachment to tradition can be an barrier to reforms like direct election of the president or multi-member districts for Congress.  But it can also be a barrier to things that would be harmful to a democratic system, as in this case.**

This leads to a question that I've touched on, but not addressed directly:  is the Trump movement fascist?  I would say no, for two reasons.  First, Fascism was clear about rejecting both democracy and tradition:  it was about the future.  Second, Fascism took the military as a model:  according to The Doctrine of Fascism (attributed to Mussolini although partly written by Giovanni Gentile), "the individual in the Fascist state is . . . multiplied, just in the same way that a soldier in a regiment is not diminished but rather increased by the number of his comrades... [the individual] is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom, but retains what is essential..."  Trump  hasn't made any attempt to organize his supporters along military lines--all he asks is that people praise him and buy his merchandise.  With January 6, there doesn't seem to have been any central organization--it was just a matter of gathering a mob and (as Trump likes to say) "we'll see what happens."  Trump also doesn't openly reject democracy or the American political tradition, but claims to be defending them.  So the movement continues to get support from people who see it as basically traditional American conservatism, just with a different style. 

A practical implication is that there is a chance to get some Republicans to break with Trump on specific issues--for example, Indiana Republicans rejected his demands to redistrict.  It wasn't just a few either:  21 of the 40 Republicans in the state Senate voted no.  I haven't seen anything on why Indiana Republicans acted differently than Republicans in other states, but there have to be some lessons there.  

*Also this question from 2002: "When it comes to protecting the country from terrorism, some people say it's more important to ensure people's constitutional rights, even if it means that some suspected terrorists are never found. Others say it's more important to find every potential terrorist, even if some innocent people are seriously hurt. Which is closer to your view?"  Opinion was almost evenly divided, with 44% saying it was more important to protect constitutional rights and 47% saying it was more important to to find every potential terrorist.  

**Elections have been postponed with no lasting harm, as in Britain during the Second World War. But doing it creates the possibility of a slippery slope.

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

What could happen here, part 3

 A few days ago, Bret Stephens wrote that American democracy will survive "because most Americans, including most Republicans, remain faithfully wedded to a democratic system. "  It's true that an overwhelming majority of Americans are committed to a democratic system in the sense of believing that governments should be selected by voters choosing from competing parties.  But as I've observed before, people aren't necessarily committed to the things that are needed to make a democratic system work.  For example, in the 1950s several surveys asked whether it was "more important to find out all the Communists in this country, even if some innocent people are accused--or is it more important to protect people who might be innocent, even if some Communists are not found out?"  Solid majorities said it was more important to find out all the Communists (e. g. 64% in January 1956).  There were also questions about whether the Socialist Party, which was fully committed to electoral democracy, should be allowed to publish newspapers.  Opinion was pretty evenly divided--the last time it was asked, 43% said yes, 5% gave a qualified yes, 39% said no, and 13% didn't know.   So maybe people were wedded to a democratic system, but many of them weren't all that faithful.  But political elites generally didn't try to appeal to the potential anti-democratic sentiments.  This was partly because of the Constitution and the legal system--it was pointless to advocate banning Socialist newspapers when that was going to be rejected by the courts--but partly because elites of both parties were more consistent than the general public in their commitment to democratic principles.  This is still true to some extent--for example, if Trump said we should cancel or delay the 2026 elections, he might get substantial support among Republican voters, but I'm confident (OK, pretty confident) that almost all Republicans in Congress would still oppose it.  However, there are many ways in which the system can be altered in ways that make it harder for those who disagree with the administration to operate, and here is where there's been a change.  Republican political elites accept or even defend things that were once considered off-limits, like mid-decade redrawing of Congressional districts, or selective denial of funds to disfavored states or organizations.*  If the process continues, the result will be an increasingly unbalanced system, where we still have regular elections offering a choice between parties, but it becomes harder for the Democrats to win and to implement their policies when they do have office.    

*See this article on Trump's actions against Colorado.  A revealing passage:  "Some Colorado Republicans blame the state’s Democratic leaders for provoking Mr. Trump’s wrath."

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Who wanted war?

 A couple of days ago, Christopher Caldwell wrote "Republicans trusted Mr. Trump to take over their stumbling party in large part because he cursed the George W. Bush administration for having led the country into the Iraq war with a bunch of specious talking points about weapons of mass destruction."   Today a New York Times news story said "Mr. Trump won the presidency in 2016 in part by rejecting nation-building and foreign wars."  This seems wrong to me--Trump has always been clear that he has no objection to war as long as it's profitable.  I searched the Trump Twitter Archive through 2016 and found nothing objecting to the original rationales for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but lots of complaints that we were spending money and not getting Iraqi oil.  

A Pew survey in September 2015 asked Republicans about a hypothetical candidate for the party's nomination who "wants to send US ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria."  Among people who favored Trump, 56% said they would be more likely to support such a candidate and 26% that they would be more likely to oppose one; among people who favored someone else, it was 52% more likely to support and 26% more likely to oppose (the rest said it wouldn't make much difference to them).  That is, opinions about sending ground troops to fight ISIS were unrelated to Republican candidate preference.  

This question was part of a series.  Two of the other items--"wants to end the nuclear agreement with Iran" and "will compromise with members of the Democratic Party" were also unrelated to the choice between Trump and other candidates.   Three others were related.  One was "wants to deport all immigrants living in the US illegally."   Among Trump supporters, 51% said they would be more likely to support such a candidate and 18% that they'd be more likely to oppose; among supporters of other candidates, it was 36% and 39%.  Another was "wants to end federal funding for Planned Parenthood."  Among Trump supporters, 42% more likely to support and 27% less likely; among supporters of other candidates, it was 57% to 20%.  Finally, on "wants to raise taxes on wealthy Americans," 44% of Trump supporters said they would be more likely to support and 24% to oppose; among supporters of other candidates, it was 30% to support and 39% oppose.  That is, Trump supporters were more in favor of a hard line on immigration, but more moderate on Planned Parenthood and taxes on wealthy people.

It's often said that Trump has achieved a takeover, sometimes even a "hostile takeover," of the Republican party.  But it's actually gone in both directions:  he's moved the party towards his position on some issues (especially immigration and tariffs) but has adopted orthodox Republican positions on others where he once seemed to be more moderate (taxes, abortion, "our always under siege Second Amendment").  Between his first and second terms, Trump also has taken up some previously fringe positions on the right, like unbridled hostility to colleges and universities, and introduced them into the mainstream. 

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research] 

Guilty men (and women)

In 2016, Donald Trump lost the popular vote to a weak candidate, although the mysterious workings of the Electoral College gave him the presidency.  During his first term, he never reached a 50% approval rating.  In the 2020 election, despite having the advantage of incumbency, he lost both the popular and electoral votes to a mediocre candidate.  So why did the Republicans ignore this record of failure and nominate him again in 2024?  Most observers seem to think that the answer is obvious--it was because he had a strong hold on ordinary Republican voters.  

After the 2020 election, there were a number of surveys that asked if you wanted Trump to run again in 2024.  I compared the results for similar surveys about Gore running in 2004 and Kerry running in 2008. 

The years in the x-axis are 1 for the first year after he lost, 2 for the second, etc.  The y-axis is percent saying yes minus percent saying no.  Trump is consistently below Gore, and about the same as Kerry.  That is, he didn't have an especially large base of support among the voters.  

 These figures are based on the whole population, but some surveys limited the question to supporters of  the candidate's party.*  

Compared to Gore and Kerry, Trump looks stronger within his own party.  But another losing Republican candidate, Romney, got about the same results as Trump, suggesting that maybe Republicans generally are more willing to consider second chances.**  In any case, Trump's value of +30 means that about 35% of Republicans didn't want him to run again, and wanting someone to run again doesn't necessarily mean that you will support him.   So there was definitely an opening for other candidates.  

Turning from voters to elites, here are endorsements from Republican senators and governors (data from Ballotpedia).  

Trump announced his candidacy after the 2022 elections, and within a few days picked up his first endorsement (from Tommy Tuberville). Then there was a cluster in early 2023, and some more in April.  By April 17, he had 10.  Then other candidates got some endorsements, and by June 21st the gap had narrowed:  10 for Trump, 6 for others.  After that, Trump pulled ahead:  32 endorsed him before the Iowa caucuses, six more before the New Hampshire primaries, and another 10 before Nikki Haley dropped out.  Out of a total of 76 governors and senators, 44 endorsed Trump and  only 11 endorsed other candidates (four of those endorsed Trump after their first choice dropped out, so 48 endorsed Trump before the race was settled).  

My overall conclusion is that "the base" didn't impose Trump on Republican elites; Republican elites asked for him.  That leads back to my original point about Trump's poor record in general elections--why would professional politicians want a weak candidate at the top of the ticket?  One possibility is that they thought his electoral record was actually a good one--I can imagine an argument along those lines.  Another, and more disturbing, possibility is that they looked at the candidates and thought that Trump would be the best one to lead the country.  

*Partisan breakdowns could be found or calculated for some of the surveys of the general public, but I'll leave that to someone who has a research assistant to do the work.

**This seems plausible to me--my impression is that when Democrats lose, they blame their candidates; when Republicans lose, they blame outside forces (especially the media).

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Power to the people?

 In 1946, a short-lived survey organization called the Psychological Corporation (which seems to have been connected to the Gallup Poll) asked "Would you agree that everybody would be happier, more secure and more prosperous if working people were given more power and influence in the government, or would you say we would all be better off if the working people had no more power than they have now?" 59% said they should have more power, 29% the same, and 12% less (8% weren't sure).  The question has never been repeated, but in 2017 an AP-NORC survey asked if various groups  had "too much, too little, or neither too much nor too little power and influence in Washington?" and one of those groups was "working people".  69% said too little, 28% neither too much nor too little, and 2% too much.  The questions are similar enough so that I think we can say there's been a real change.  

Breaking it it down by education (% should be more/same/less influence, and omitting "don't knows"):

                                      1946                    2017
HS                               61/28/11              69/28/4
Some college              40/42/18              70/28/2
College grad               32/46/22              73/26/1

A small change among people with only a high school education, and a much larger change among people with a college education.  Another way to look at it is that more educated people were substantially less likely to agree that "working people" should have more power in 1946. but that education made essentially no difference in 2017.

 In 1946 unions were important and there was a good deal of labor conflict, so some respondents may have thought of labor unions when they heard "working people."  That is, to some extent the difference may be a change in the interpretation of "working people" rather than in general beliefs about who should have power and influence.  But I don't think this is the whole story:  the distribution of opinions among union members in 1946 was about the same as the distribution among the general public in 2017.  So the comparison supports a point I've made several times:  that people have become less inclined to assume that the authorities know better than ordinary people do.  Moreover, this change has been stronger among people in higher social positions.  

[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

Economics and/or politics?

 In recent decades, there have been a number of cases of "democratic erosion" or "backsliding"--elected leaders changing the rules to make it more difficult to oppose their policies or vote them out of office.  A paper by Eli Rau and Susan Stokes looks at democracies between 1995 and 2020 and finds that economic inequality was associated with a higher risk of backsliding.*  They considered per-capita GDP and the previous duration of democracy, which reduce the risk of other threats to democracy (like military coups and civil war) and find no clear connection to backsliding.  But they didn't consider another factor that I thought was potentially important:  presidential versus parliamentary systems of government.  First, it may be easier for outsiders to attain power in presidential systems, since it's not necessary to recruit and organize candidates for seats in parliament in order to win.  Second, presidential systems create the chance of conflict between the president and the legislature.  Third, it's more difficult to remove unpopular or unfit leaders in a presidential system:  impeachment takes time and requires a supermajority.  As a result, presidential systems may have a higher risk of backsliding.  

I began with a classification of forms of government from Wikipedia and reduced them to three types:  parliamentary, presidential, and an intermediate ("semi-presidential") category.  Semi-presidential systems have both a directly elected president and a prime minister who is responsible to the legislature--France is a prominent example.  There were also three countries in the system that didn't fit into the classification (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Micronesia).  The table shows the risk of backsliding by form of government:

                                          Years at risk          episodes         Risk
Parliamentary                      1115                       4                   0.35%
Semi-Presidential                  516                       5                   0.97%
Presidential                            488                     14                   2.89%
                      
Other                                         78                      0                    0

For example, the United States had 22 years of being at risk (1995-2016), and in one of those (2016) began an episode of backsliding.  2017-20 are not considered because we were already in a state of backsliding.  I'll consider the "risk" of emerging from an episode later.  

So there is a substantial association between form of government and the risk of backsliding.  But what if we consider both inequality and form of government?

Constant    -7.52        -8.15          -8.51         -8.37
                   (1.04)     (1.18)          (1.46)       (1.21)

Gini            .078          .063           .081          .078
                   (.024)       (.027)        (.031)        (.026)

Form                            .59            
                                    (.28)         

Semi                                               1.34
                                                       (0.73)

Presidential                                    1.23
                                                       (0.59)

Non-Parliamentary                                             1.26  
                                                                           (0.56)

"Form" defines parliamentary systems as 1, semi-presidential as 2, and presidential as 3.  The third column compares each to the baseline of parliamentary systems.  The estimates for presidential and semi-presidential are similar, so the fourth column combines them into a single "non-parliamentary" group.  Statistical criteria don't permit a choice between the models in columns 2-4, but I think the arguments I gave apply about equally to presidential and semi-presidential forms, so I would go with #4 if I had to choose.  I thought that controlling for form of government might reduce or eliminate the estimated effect of inequality, but that wasn't the case.  

I also estimated models for the chance of leaving a state of backsliding.  Neither inequality nor the form of government had any clear effect, so I don't show the results.  

*The classification is from a working paper by Melis Laebens, who spoke of "executive aggrandizement," and suggested that it was a development of the post-Cold War period.  Until then, "aspiring autocrats would not be as concerned with maintaining a democratic facade."